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Abstract 
 
We begin with a brief background to the current Chinese power market reforms which began 
with the State Council No.9 Document of March 2015. We introduce 14 different electricity 
reform elements from international experience. Under each of these reform elements we will 
discuss: its theoretical significance; general reform experiences with it; and its application in 
the Chinese context. Our motivation is how China might bring down the currently high 
industrial price of electricity. We identify four promising sources of price reduction: the 
introduction of economic dispatch of power plants; rationalisation of electricity transmission 
and distribution; reduction of high rates of investment; and rebalancing of electricity charges 
towards residential customers. We draw out some overall lessons and identify some 
important points for future research into Chinese power market reform. 
 
Keywords: power market reform, international experience, China, industrial electricity price 
JEL classification: L94 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In 2015 China was the world’s largest electricity producer (24% of global production), the 
second largest producer of non-hydro renewable energy (17% of global production) and the 
largest producer of coal (3.5 billion tonnes of coal a year or 47% of global production) 2. 
Around 45% of Chinese coal production is consumed in its power sector and 65% of all its 
electricity comes from coal3. China’s coal based electricity sector alone produces at least 7% 
of global carbon dioxide equivalent emissions4, and around one third of China’s domestic 
emissions. As Figures 1 and 2 indicate this rise to global prominence is relatively recent and 
has occurred extremely rapidly in last decades. These figures provide the backdrop to the 
significant international interest in the Chinese power market and its reform. 
 
As we describe below, economic reform of the power sector has been on-going since 1985. 
However, under the current Five Year Plan (FYP13: 2016-2020) China’s electricity sector is 
undergoing a major transition from a state managed system to a market price based one5, 
following the publication of the No.9 document of March 2015 which re-launched a new push 
for ‘power market reform’ in China. This paper focuses on the international lessons for China 
in the light of the current round of power market reforms and paying attention to the particular 
context of the Chinese electricity system. 
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Figure 1: 
China’s global share in the fuel consumption for its power generation  
 
Source: BP statistics (2016).6 
 
Figure 2: 
China’s global share in CO2, coal and electricity production 
 
 
Source: BP statistics (2016).7 
 
 
Looking across the world at electricity reform we can identify fourteen reform elements that 
form part of a modern power market reform. We take 11 of these from Paul Joskow (2008)8 
who identifies eleven key components of successful processes and supplement these with 3 
additional reform elements appropriate to a low carbon transition (based on Pollitt and Anaya, 
20169), which involves currently subsidised (but lower carbon) generation technologies. We 
group the main reform components into four general areas: market restructuring and 
ownership changes; supportive secondary market arrangements; appropriate economic 
regulation; and, efficient promotion of low emission technologies. To these four general areas 
Joskow adds appropriate transition mechanisms, to recognise the fact that power market 
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reform is complex and that a successful transformation cannot be achieved in one step. We 
use these to organise our discussion of the Chinese case below. 
 
Successful power market reform in a low emissions context, according to Joskow (2008) and 
Pollitt and Anaya (2016), must therefore take due account of the following: 
 
Market restructuring and ownership changes: 
(1) vertical separation of competitive elements (generation and retail) from natural monopoly 
networks; 
(2) sufficient horizontal restructuring of generation to create a competitive wholesale market; 
(3) the creation of wide area independent system operators; and 
(4) privatisation of monopolies. 
 
Supportive secondary market arrangements: 
(5) creation of spot and ancillary services markets to support real time balancing of the 
system;  
(6) participation of demand side in wholesale electricity markets; 
(7) regulated third party access to, and efficient allocation of scarce transmission capacity.  
 
Appropriate economic regulation: 
(8) unbundling of regulated network charges and competitive segment charges;  
(9) mechanisms to ensure competitive procurement of wholesale power for regulated final 
customer groups; 
(10) the creation of independent regulatory agencies to regulate monopoly network charges 
and monitor competitive segments.  
 
Efficient promotion of low emission technologies: 
(11) competitive procurement processes for low carbon generation, with some exposure to 
wholesale price variability; 
(12) cost reflective access terms for renewables; and  
(13) appropriate pricing of environmental externalities (both carbon dioxide and other 
atmospheric pollutants, such as sulphur dioxide). 
 
And finally, all good power market reforms (and indeed, significant economic reforms more 
generally) involve: 
(14) appropriate transition mechanisms. 
 
The aim of this research project has been to understand the nature of the electricity transition 
process in China and how it can draw on the extensive reform experience of European 
countries (which began in 1990 in the UK), as well as other reforming countries (in particular, 
the US). The EU Legislative process has consisted of three electricity directives (1996, 2003 
and 2009), that have successively opened up the EU electricity market, in line with Joskow’s 
model for successful reform (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005; Pollitt, 2009). These have 
introduced a competitive wholesale market, regulated third party access to transmission and 
distribution networks, legal separation of retail businesses, choice of retailer for all customers, 
unbundling of transmission and distribution businesses from the rest of the sector, regulated 
cross border trading and independent regulatory authorities. The process has been slow and 
different European countries have at times moved at very different speeds in implementing 
reform, but the overall progress has been remarkable. 
 
Since the start of the reform process in the EU there has also been a significant push towards 
a low carbon electricity system with a large emphasis on increasing the share of renewables 
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in the electricity system and the introduction of a cap on emissions from the electricity sector 
and the introduction of the EU Emissions Trading System 10  (EU ETS). China is now 
undergoing its own renewable and low carbon electricity transition, with a remarkable growth 
of renewable and nuclear energy and significant moves towards a national carbon market11. 
This poses new challenges for the reform process around how to successful integrate 
renewables into wholesale energy and ancillary services markets; how to facilitate 
appropriate levels of network access for renewables; appropriate mechanisms for financing 
renewables; and whether there are implications for the remuneration mechanisms for fossil 
fuel power plants in the presence of large amounts of renewables. Reform points 11 to 13 
above are much less well developed globally (and less supported by empirical evidence). 
Advanced jurisdictions (such as the UK, Germany, California and New York) are currently 
experimenting with different mechanisms to support their low carbon transition (Pollitt and 
Anaya, 2016)12. 
 
This project aims to collect information relevant to all of the 14 points identified above and to 
discuss with Chinese stakeholders what China is doing under each of these reform elements. 
It will seek to assess progress with reform and also what China is learning about how the 
reform model needs to be adapted for its own particular circumstances. While the outline of a 
successful reform model may be easily stated, the details vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Thus electricity reform in Germany is very different from the UK and California is different 
from New York. In what follows, we aim draw out what the particular lessons from the reform 
model outlined above are for China. Most importantly, we seek to identify what are the key 
institutional problems to be overcome in bringing about a successful electricity reform 
transition in the World’s most significant electricity system. Our main goal is intended to be a 
positive contribution to on-going debates about the detailed implementation of electricity 
sector reform in China and to be a platform for future discussion and informed input on the 
appropriateness of international reform experience in the Chinese context. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin with a brief background to the current Chinese 
power market reforms. We then discuss each of the 14 reform elements that we identify 
above. Under each of these reform elements we will discuss: its theoretical significance; 
general reform experiences with it; and its application in the Chinese context. We conclude 
with some overall lessons and identify some important points for future research into Chinese 
power market reform. 
 
2  Background to electricity reform in China 
 
China has embarked on a prolonged process of electricity reform since 1985, as outlined in 
Figure 3 and Table 1. Up until 1984 there was no private involvement in electricity generation, 
however after 1985 and in common with other developing countries facing power shortages 
China did allow multiple public investors and private investors into the power generation 
sector to help alleviate shortages of electricity. The most significant recent reform was the 
reorganisation of the power sector in 2002. 13 This saw the separation of generation and 
transportation/retailing of electricity and represented the most significant structural change to 
the industry in the modern era. It also saw the creation of two grid companies: State Grid 
Company of China and China Southern Grid (covering four southern provinces). A regulatory 
agency for electricity was created and there was an expectation that China would embark on 
the pathway of the standard international reform model with the creation of competitive 
wholesale power markets and regulated network tariffs. However, this process stalled around 
2007. Generators continued to receive regulated prices for their power and network tariffs 
were not separately identified and all customers bought power from their local transmission 
and distribution monopoly. Thus, transmission, distribution and retail continue to be 100% 
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vertically integrated. There remains significant support for the large grid companies as 
enabling effective response to large natural disasters (e.g. the Wenchuan earthquake in 
2008) and as a counterbalance to the monopoly power of equipment suppliers such as GE 
and Siemens.14 
 
It is worth noting that other energy sectors in China, such as oil and gas state-owned 
companies, were also liberalised during 1990s. Lin (2008) points out that the Chinese central 
reformers of oil and gas industries recognized the need to depart from the decentralized 
approach to industrial governance as early as 199315. However, the reform process had to 
wait until key domestic interest groups were weakened by macroeconomic disequilibria and 
global price shocks in the latter half of 1990s. Thus, the Chinese electricity sector reforms, 
similar to other global reform experiences, take a long period of time, and rely on national 
cross-sectoral learning.   
 
The previous reforms of the energy prices, resource taxes and subsidies have also paved 
way for this round of electricity market reform, which has made great progress in assigning a 
more significant role for the market in allocating resources in China since 1984 (see Mou, 
2014; Lin and Ouyang, 2014; Paltsev and Zhang, 2015; Zhang, 2014). Moreover, a new wave 
of comprehensive reforms were launched by the Chinese leadership in November 2013, and 
the electricity sector is under the government spotlight due to its important role in helping 
China’s transition to a low-carbon economy and in addressing local air pollution. 
 
Figure 3: 
Reform timeline for electricity sector 
 
Source: An Bo et al. (2015, p.6). 
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Table 1 
Reform timeline for electricity sector in China 
 
 1980-1984 1985-2001 2002-Present 
Industrial Structure  Vertical integration Vertical integration Unbundled 
generation and 
transmission & 
distribution (2002) 
Ownership Predominantly central 
government owned 
Central and 
provincial 
government 
ownership. 
Increasing private 
investment in 
generation 
Central and 
provincial 
government 
ownership, declining 
share of private 
investment 
Dispatch Economic dispatch 
based on total 
embedded cost 
Equal shares 
dispatch 
Equal shares 
dispatch; pilot 
projects for energy 
efficient dispatch 
(2007) 
Wholesale 
Generation Pricing 
Internal transfer 
prices  
Investment recovery 
based on financial 
lifetime (1985) 
Investment recovery 
based on operational 
lifetime (2001) 
Benchmark price 
(2004) 
Fuel price-wholesale 
price co-movement 
(2004) 
 
Source: Kahrl et al. (2013, p.362) 
 
As Table 1 shows, the regulated prices received by individual power plants have become 
more sophisticated over time in adjusting to wholesale fuel prices (particularly the price of 
coal).16 However, dispatch is not done on a least cost (merit order basis), but on an equal 
shares basis. This involves plants of a similar vintage being allocated an equal number of 
annual running hours and being dispatched on a daily basis in line with the need to achieve 
an equal number of total running hours. We return to this below. 
 
The latest round of power market reforms began in March 2015, promoted by the publication 
of the CPC Central Committee and State Council No.9 Document of March 2015 
(summarized in Table 2). This document foresees a renewed push to establish competitive 
wholesale and retail electricity markets especially for industrial electricity customers. It is 
supported by a number of ongoing market pilot projects. 
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Table 2 
Document No.9 of March 2015 and stated reform process 
 
Key Policy Goals Supporting Documents Reform Process  
(mentioned in Document No.9) 
Policy Goals No.1 
Promoting electricity power 
pricing mechanisms 
Implementing Opinions on 
Document No. 9  
State Council China and CPC 
Central Committee issued the 
‘Opinions on Further Deepening 
Power Sector Reform’ (Document 
No. 9) in March 2015. There are two 
main stages for this round of 
electricity reform in China. In the first 
stage (from March to June 2015), 
NDRC and other related 
governmental agencies announced 
five supporting documents. In the 
second stage (November 2015), 
NDRC and NEA further issued 
another six supporting documents. 
These supporting documents 
provide the practical guidance for 
implementing the seven main policy 
goals set in the Document No.9, 
which cover the issues of   electricity 
price, power trading system, 
wholesale side design, power grid 
and governmental supervision.   
Electricity ancillary services in China 
have long been provided by grid‐
connected power plants. Document 
No.9 changes this situation by 
establishing a new “shared 
responsibility” mechanism. This 
"shared responsibility, shared gains" 
mechanism improves the original 
compensation mechanism, and 
welcomes user participation in 
ancillary services by contracting with 
either generator companies or the 
grid. In March 2015, the supplement 
policy document - Guiding Opinions 
on Improving Electric Operation and 
Regulation to Promote Greater and 
Fuller Use of Clean Energy – was 
published, which aims to advance 
the ancillary services and promote 
renewable energy consumption at 
the same time.   
Implementation Opinions on 
Promoting Transmission-Distribution 
Price Reform 
Policy Goal No.2 
Reforming power trading systems 
and refining market-oriented 
trading systems 
Notification of Perfecting Formation 
Mechanism of Trans-Provincial and 
Trans-Regional Power Trading 
Prices 
Implementation Opinions on 
Promoting Power Market 
Construction 
Policy Goal No.3 
Reforming power generation, 
power utilization and the current 
market mechanisms 
 
 
Notification of Perfecting Power 
Emergency Response Mechanism 
and Comprehensive City Pilots of 
Managing Power-Demand Side 
Implementation Opinions on Orderly 
Releasing Plans of Power 
Generation and Power Utilization 
 
Policy Goal No.4 
Establishing independent 
electricity trading institutions and 
a fair and regulated trading 
platform 
Implementation Opinions on 
Establishing Power Trading 
Institutions and Their Normative 
Operation 
Policy Goal No.5 
Steadily reforming power sales 
side and distribution  
Implementation Opinions on 
Promoting Power-Sales Side Reform 
Policy Goals No.6 
Enhancing fair access to power 
grid and power transmission 
Guidance Opinions on Improving 
Power Operation Adjustment to 
Facilitate Multiple and Full 
Development of Clean Energy 
Guidance Opinions on Reinforcing 
and Regulating Supervision and 
Management of Coal-Fired Self-
Generation Power Plants  
 
Policy Goal No.7 
Reinforcing electricity safety, 
scientific supervision and an 
integrated power planning system  
Supervision and Examination 
Procedures for Pricing Costs of 
Power Transmission and Distribution 
(Trial) 
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Sources: “Deepening Reform of the Power Sector, Document No. 9, March 21, 2015”, China 
State Council (2015) and China5e Research Institute (2016, p.4-5). 
 
It is interesting to compare the 7 policy goals of the No.9 document with the 14 reform 
elements [(1) – (14)] we outlined in the Introduction. Policy Goals No.1 to No.6 relate to the 
economic reform of the sector. Policy Goal No.1 relates to unbundling of regulated network 
charges from competitive segment charges (reform point: 8). Policy Goals No.2 – No.5 are 
around the creation of a competitive wholesale market with sufficient vertical separation of 
generation [reform points: (1) and (2)] and retail from the natural monopoly elements [reform 
point (1)]. Policy Goal No.6 targets the efficient allocation of scarce transmission capacity 
(reform point 6). Interestingly, the wording of the No.9 document emphasises the ‘trading’ of 
electricity. International reform experience emphasises the use of market mechanisms and 
the harnessing of competition to allocate scarce resources. It also emphasises ‘separation’, 
the idea that the roles of various actors within the sector need to be clearly defined and in 
particular that boundaries need to be strictly drawn between competitive and monopoly 
activities, with a key role for regulation in ensuring non-discriminatory access and 
implementing incentive regulation. Additionally, under the Policy Goals No.2, 4 and 6, the 
No.9 document emphasises the significance of ancillary services (reform point 5), and 
stresses the establishment and improvement of purchasing mechanisms for ancillary 
services. 
 
Before embarking on any discussion of appropriate reform steps to take in the Chinese 
electric power sector, it is important to acknowledge the achievements of the sector under 
public ownership 17 . The country has been fully electrified and the technical losses in 
transmission and distribution were only 5.8% in 2013. The sheer scale of the sector by 2015 
is illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the distribution and quantity of capacity type and 
generated electricity. Figure 5 shows the enormous physical build rate and financial 
investment involved (around $120bn in 2015). Electrification is universal, has kept pace with 
sustained high rates of demand growth and the sector is self-financing (unlike in India). This 
has been an impressive engineering undertaking by global standards. 
 
Figure 4 
The size of the Chinese electricity sector 
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Source: NBS (2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
The scale of power plant capacity under construction  
 
 
Source: China Electricity Council (2015) 
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Source: China Electricity Council (2015) 
 
 
However, China’s rapid growth of electricity demand (at 8.6% p.a. from 2008 to 2014) has 
appeared to moderate recently (1% in 2015), as can be seen in Figure 6. If this is a genuine 
‘new normal’ for power demand then the rate of investment in new capacity needs to also 
slow down.  
 
 
Figure 6 
China’s Electricity Consumption Slowing Down 
 
 
 
Source: CEC website, Available at: 
http://www.cec.org.cn/guihuayutongji/tongjxinxi/niandushuju/2013-04-19/100589.html 
 
There is a clear motivation for the current round of reforms. This is the high price of industrial 
electricity relative to competitor countries, in particular the US. 
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Table 3 Electricity price and Fuel input price differential with US 
 
  
Industrial Electricity  
Price  
(US $/kWh) 
In 2014 
Coal price for 
generation  
(US $/kWh) 
in 2014 
Gas price for 
generation  
(US $/kWh)  
in 2014 
Residential 
Electricity Price 
(US $/kWh) 
 in 2014 
US  0.0710 0.0241  0.0159  0.1252 
China 0.1068 0.0384  0.0778  0.0908 
     
China 
minus 
US 
0.0358 
(50% higher) 
0.0143 
 
0.0619 
 
-0.0344 
(27% lower) Notes: Chinese prices include VAT tax, see http://cn.manganese.org/images/uploads/board-documents/8._2015_AC_-_Xizhou_Zhou-CN.pdf (p. 20). 
Source: Chinese data from Chinese government website 
(http://zfxxgk.nea.gov.cn/auto92/201509/t20150902_1959.htm) and US data from EIA 
website 
 
Table 3 shows two major differences with the US – residential prices are lower than in the US 
and lower than industrial prices and fuel input prices are significantly higher in China. The 
higher industrial price is not fully explained by higher marginal fuel prices (where gas is the 
fuel of choice in the US and coal is the fuel of choice in China). Higher marginal fuel prices in 
2014 (coal in China minus gas in the US) only explains 63% of the differential, meaning that 
37% (or 12% of the 2014 industrial price) is not explained by fuel cost differentials, though 
some of the price is explained by the higher general value added taxation on the sector. 
However, given the lower unit labour and unit capital costs in China, we might expect Chinese 
non-fuel costs to be lower than in the US. The reform of residential tariffs in China is difficult 
due to the political economy of raising power prices to cost-reflective levels. Moreover, the 
cross-subsidy from higher industrial electricity prices to lower residential prices can be viewed 
as a way of improving the efficiency of energy-intensive companies (see Sun and Lin, 2013; 
He and Renier, 2016; Zhang, 2014). 
 
 
3 Assessment of Reform Steps  
3.1 Market restructuring and ownership changes 
 
3.1.1 Vertical Separation and Horizontal Restructuring 
(1) vertical separation of competitive elements (generation and retail) from natural monopoly 
networks; 
(2) sufficient horizontal restructuring of generation to create a competitive wholesale market; 
 
3.1.1.1 Theoretical significance 
 
The electricity sector consists of different vertically related segments with different cost and 
innovation characteristics. These give rise to different minimum efficient sizes of firms in 
relation to the relevant market segment. These segments are: electrical equipment; 
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generation; transmission; distribution; and retailing. Electrical equipment is a competitive input 
sector, subject to global competition. Generation can be organised into wide area markets 
where generating firms, which could consist of a single power plant, can compete to provide 
electricity at lowest cost and to invest to meet future power demand. Transmission has 
natural monopoly characteristics in the operation of given collections of assets in particular 
areas. Distribution is a local natural monopoly (often very local) in the operation and 
investment in lower voltage networks. Retailing is a potentially competitive activity, which 
involves contracting for power and metering and billing final electricity customers. Individual 
retail firms can operate over wide areas or concentrate on particular geographies. Each of 
these activities can have very different minimum efficient scales, risk profiles and very 
different dominant logics among their management teams. Generation and retailing require 
significant marketing and trading activity, while transmission and distribution are engineering 
led activities. Generation and retailing are higher risk investments, while transmission and 
distribution are much lower risk investments. 
 
Differences in the characteristics of the different vertical segments of the electricity sector 
argue strongly for vertical separation. Where network monopoly segments remain integrated 
with competitive generation/retail activities it is necessary for access to these segments to be 
priced on a non-discriminatory basis, so that any competing generation or retail firms with 
identical network access requirements are charged the same access charge in order not to 
distort competition between them. 
 
The generation market is potentially competitive in all but the smallest electricity systems.18 
However such competition depends on the existence of sufficient firms in the price setting 
part of the market. Thus a large number of base load power plants will not discipline the price 
in the market at peak times where there are only a small number of firms with peak power 
capacity. If there are only a small number of firms with price-setting plants, then collusion is 
likely. It is also the case that if one firm has the capacity to strategically withdraw capacity 
such as to leave the market without sufficient capacity (as measured by the Residual Supply 
Index) then that firm can exercise market power to generally raise prices19.  
 
3.1.1.2 General reform experience 
 
Reform experience across the world has involved significant vertical separation. The EU 
electricity directives (1996, 2003 and 2009) have specified the creation of competitive 
generation and retail markets with full legal unbundling from the monopoly transmission and 
distribution networks.20 This has over time led to divestment of transmission and distribution 
businesses and the creation of separate generation-retail companies. There has been a 
progressive opening up of the retail market to competition, starting with large industrial users 
of electricity, then all non-domestic customers and finally domestic customers. 
 
In the US there has been a similar process of reform, with a notable absence of privatisation, 
because most of the industry was already in the private sector21. This has involved many 
individual states forcing significant generation asset sales by incumbent integrated utilities, 
the expansion of regional generation markets and the gradual extension of retail competition 
from large industrial users to smaller users. 
 
Where vertical disintegration has not been pursued aggressively there are some well-
documented cases of continuing abuse of market power by incumbent monopoly network 
companies against their competitors in the competitive segments of the industry, such as in 
Chile22 and Germany23. 
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The introduction of competitive wholesale power markets that moves away from regulation of 
the generation segment of the electricity sector does pose a significant risk in any power 
market reform. The early wholesale market in Great Britain following privatisation was 
characterised by two large firms setting the price 90% of the time.24 This gave rise to tacit 
collusion between the two firms, which resulted in the need for first price regulation in the 
wholesale market and then forced sales of generation assets to create a more competitive 
market. Significant problems with the Residual Supply Index existed in the Californian 
electricity market in the run up to its power crisis of 2000-01.25  
 
However, experience has suggested that market power risks can be mitigated by allowing 
generators to sign longer-term contracts with suppliers. Long-term contracts are much more 
potentially competitive than spot-market contracts, because they can be signed with new 
entrants prior to entry. It was the failure to allow long term contracting that significantly 
contributed to the Californian electricity crisis. 26  Short-term market power can also be 
significantly mitigated by ‘market abuse’ regulation, which limits the ability of generators to 
strategically withdraw capacity from the market at short notice to drive up prices.27 
 
The significance of this sort of collusion between fossil fuel generators has declined in many 
markets with the rise of subsidised must run renewable generation and the general slowdown 
in electricity demand growth. 
 
3.1.1.3 Chinese context 
 
 
China has taken significant and impressive steps to vertically restructure its electricity 
industry. The most impressive of these was the 2002 reorganisation, which created the 7 
large companies from one signal state owned company 28 . This did effectively separate 
generation from transmission and distribution. It also created two comparative transmission 
companies. Figure 7 shows some evidence that the smaller China Southern Grid is a more 
efficient company than State Grid, suggesting the value that China Southern Grid provides as 
spur to greater efficiency in the sector as a whole. It also created the potential for genuine 
national competition in generation, drawing on the experience of competition in markets 
generally, which suggests that 5 roughly equally sized firms is the minimum necessary to 
ensure effective competition in a market29. However the size of all these companies remains 
a barrier to the emergence of a competitive market in generation, retail and procurement and 
retail. By assets in 2014, State Grid is four times larger than China Southern Grid and three 
times larger than the largest generator. State Grid has 1.7 million employees, making it one of 
the largest corporations in the world by employees and it contains 40% of all the power 
sector’s employees (including equipment manufacturers).30 
 
Further steps have been taken recently to separate out the network businesses within the two 
main grid companies in order to clearly identify the regulatory asset base and associated 
network cost from the power procurement cost, as part of the market pilot projects and in line 
with Policy Goal No.1 of the No.9 Document. This is necessary to allow identification of a 
non-discriminatory third party access tariff for network access. 
 
 
Figure 7: 
Relative performance of State Grid and China Southern Grid 
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Sources: SGCC (2015) and CSPG (2015) 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, State Grid and China Southern Grid exercise significant influence on the 
supply chain and the course of power market reform in the electricity sector in China. This is 
because they continue to integrate transmission, distribution and retailing within their 
extremely large service areas. They are also absolutely very large companies with significant 
political influence within the sector, able to influence the speed of reform in the competitive 
segments. It was clear that following the 2002 reforms China was following then international 
reform model and that there was a need for further reforms around 2007 to complete the 
initial separation process. However, following a severe winter in 2008, which caused some 
power shortages, the Grid companies were able to argue that progressing with vertical 
separation put security of supply at risk and further reforms were halted at that time. 
 
Other countries’ experience suggests that the organisation of electricity sector does not 
require transmission and distribution to be integrated 31 . There is also no evidence that 
security of supply is put at risk by vertical unbundling of transmission, distribution and 
retailing. Quite the reverse, the evidence is that if anything countries with complete ownership 
of unbundling of distribution (from both transmission and distribution) have seen 
improvements in quality of service32. Transmission systems are subject to regional/national 
monopoly, whereas distribution can be a local monopoly at the level of the province or 
municipality. This has the advantage of comparative competition between distribution 
companies and competition between management teams, increased competition in input 
markets and increased responsiveness to customer demands (from generators and from 
electricity customers) for quality of service. 
 
State Grid and China Southern Grid currently have a monopoly of retailing for almost all 
customers, apart from large electricity users who can self-generate. This will slow the process 
of introducing competition into the wholesale market where individual generators compete 
with grid companies with huge power procurement portfolios for final customers. Such 
competition needs to be non-discriminatory and this depends on the access charge that the 
grid companies charge correctly reflecting the average cost of transmission and distribution 
(not including retailing costs). The ability for incumbent network-retailers to reallocate costs 
between their network and retail businesses can significantly slow the process of competition. 
They can do this by allocating much of the fixed costs of their retail business to the network 
business. In the UK the regulator enforced strict asset allocation rules between distribution 
and retail, within the incumbent regional electricity distribution companies as the market was 
opened up to competition. This was because the companies initially tried allocate 90% of their 
shared assets to distribution, in order to increase network access charges to new entrants 
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and reduce costs within their own retail businesses. The regulator ruled that only around 75% 
of these costs could be allocated to distribution (see Domah and Pollitt, 2001). 
 
As we have already noted there already is substantial dispersion of ownership of generation 
assets between companies in China. The 2002 reform did lead to a substantial drop in the 
price paid to generators for coal-fired generation (apparently due to significant competition in 
construction between generators)33. There is also a substantial emerging surplus of fossil 
power generation, which suggests that wholesale power prices will not rise above the current 
level that customers as the market for industrial power is opened up to competition. However 
within particular provinces residual market power is a potential issue, especially where there 
are transmission constraints which give rise (for grid stability reasons) to must-run fossil fuel 
plants on the system34. 
 
Generators still receive regulated prices for their generation. Table 4 shows the tariffs for coal 
fired generation in 2014. These are often above the final retail price of industrial power in the 
US ($0.071/kWh), showing that the regulated prices look generous by international standards. 
  
Table 4  
Benchmark Generation tariffs of coal-fired power plants (with FGD) in 2014 
Province 
Electricity  
tariff  
(in RMB/kWh) 
Electricity  
tariff  
(in US $/kWh) 
Province 
Electricity 
tariff 
(in RMB/kWh) 
Electricity  
tariff 
(in US $/kWh) 
Beijing 0.3987 0.0649  Hubei 0.4702  0.0765  
Tianjing 0.4085 0.0665  Hunan 0.5269  0.0858  
Hebei North 0.4228 0.0688  Guangdong 0.5122  0.0834  
Hebei South 0.4316 0.0703  Guangxi 0.4672  0.0761  
Shanxi 0.3887 0.0633  Hainan 0.4888  0.0796  
InnerM. West 0.3094 0.0504  Chongqin 0.4401  0.0716  
InnerM. East 0.3714 0.0605  Sichuan 0.4607  0.0750  
Liaoning 0.412 0.0671  Guizhou 0.3791  0.0617  
Jilin 0.4094 0.0666  Yunnan 0.3633  0.0591  
Heilongjiang 0.355 0.0578  Shaanxi 0.4002  0.0651  
Shanghai 0.4638 0.0755  Gansu 0.3329  0.0542  
Jiangsu 0.442 0.0720  Qinghai 0.3570  0.0581  
Zhejiang 0.469 0.0763  Ningxia 0.2862  0.0466  
Anhui 0.4331 0.0705  Xinjiang 0.2620  0.0427  
Fujian 0.4393 0.0715  Henan 0.4382  0.0713  
Jiangxi 0.4872 0.0793  Shandong 0.4472  0.0728  
Note: the exchange rate between US $ and RMB is 6.1428 in 2014. Source: NEA website (http://www.nea.gov.cn/) 
 
 
The scope for competition in generation already exists in China. The issue is the extent to 
which transmission constraints will allow existing fossil fuel generators to compete with each 
other for final customers. One issue that is relevant in the wholesale market pilots is that 
these markets only cover part of both supply and demand. In order for a meaningful market 
price to emerge in this segment supply and demand curves must be allowed to cross and 
give rise to single equilibrium price in each trading period. This single market price should be 
paid by all demanding loads to all supplying generators in the market at that price. This 
means that sufficient amounts of capacity and of load need to be in the market such that the 
amount of generation being allocated by a market mechanism can give rise to meaningful 
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price. The introduction of wholesale markets, in which fossil fuel generators were expected to 
participate without subsidy, would subject new fossil fuel generation investment to market 
incentives and reduce current over investment in new fossil fuel generation capacity. 
 
If the amount of supply and demand in the market is restricted to be less than a market 
clearing quantity, then the generators in the market can exercise market power and charge 
high prices. This seemed to be the case in the Yunnan pilot in 2016, where the price 
determination mechanism was to restrict demand and supply in the monthly contract market 
and then inversely match and average the highest bids and lowest offers. This gave rise to 
different ‘market’ prices for each block of power in the market, but also scope for gaming by 
buyers and sellers. Thus, for example, the lowest cost generator could raise its bid and 
receive a higher payment. 
 
3.1.2 The creation of wide area independent system operators (3) 
 
3.1.2.1 Theoretical significance 
 
A system operator is the ‘air traffic controller’ of the electricity system35. A key job of the 
system operator is to balance the market in real time on a least cost basis. The larger the 
control area the more that the system can optimise the use of low cost sources of generation 
and economise on the holding of reserve capacity (both in the short and the long run). 
Competitive wholesale markets for electricity are usually co-incident with the area of 
operation of a single system operator. In many liberalisation processes (e.g. in England and 
Wales) a wide area system operator already existed and it was a straightforward process to 
move from cost based merit order dispatch to bid based dispatch. Wide area dispatch on the 
basis of least cost is the key to reducing total system operating costs. 
 
Extensions of system operator control areas by merging pre-existing control areas has the 
effect of increasing wholesale market size and single price areas (this has happened in Great 
Britain, with the extension of National Grid’s control area to include Scotland as well as 
England and Wales, and in the US with the extension of PJM’s control area).  
 
The operational independence of the system operator from generators and from retailers (and 
from local, provincial and national governments) is important because of the strong link 
between being physically dispatched and the revenue of individual generators. It is essential 
that dispatch is in the best interests of the system as a whole rather than the narrow interests 
of one ownership party (or group of parties) in the system. 
 
3.1.2.2 General reform experience 
 
The evidence is that system integration and joint system operation and dispatch has 
significantly reduced costs and improved efficiency. The extension and evolution of 
independent system operators in the US, bringing together the previous multiple control areas 
of individual vertically integrated utilities has reduced costs. PJM’s control area extension has 
produced significant measured benefits in terms of reducing pricing inefficiencies between 
previously separated areas36. 
 
System operator dispatch can be successfully conducted on three different bases in 
liberalised markets. Each of them involves dispatch consistent with least cost power plants 
being dispatched first. Cost based dispatch has been practiced in Latin America37 and in 
Ireland38. This involves plants being dispatched in order of audited marginal operating costs 
calculated on the basis of known plant operating parameters. This is a good way of 
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restraining market power in smaller markets with large pivotal owners of generation plant. 
Central price based dispatch involves dispatching plants on the basis of price based bids. 
This is similar to marginal cost based dispatch except the parameters used are bids 
submitted by the generators in the day-ahead market. This is the standard dispatch system in 
US ISOs. Self-dispatch is the practice in the EU39. This involves generators declaring that 
they want to be dispatched to the system operator (on the basis of their contractual position), 
who then has to dispatch them subject to system operating constraints. In theory self-dispatch 
is more efficient than central dispatch because it can reflect more up to date information on 
the operating and demand conditions facing individual plants. In practice it gives rise to the 
possibility that plants will be dispatched out of merit order. Evidence suggests it is slightly 
more inefficient than central dispatch.40 
 
 
Figure 8: 
Regional and provincial grid control areas in China 
 
Source: Wang and Chen (2012, p.144).  
 
 
3.1.2.3 Chinese context 
 
In China there are 6 regions of operation of generation system (see Figure 8) and the 2002 
reform envisaged moving towards 6 regional power markets41. This process has not been 
completed and dispatch is largely organised at the provincial level with some higher-level 
regional management of bulk power flows – which are often seasonal – between provinces. 
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Provincial level dispatch is inefficient and does not fully exploit the large opportunities for 
trading power across regions (e.g. between Yunnan where this often surplus hydro power and 
Guangdong where there are much higher marginal production costs).42 Guangdong has three 
dispatch centres, while Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei operate a joint dispatch centre. The 
dispatch centres are owned and operated by the relevant grid company, but the annual 
allocation of hours (for the period 1 January to 31 December) is determined by the provincial 
government, though the process of its determination is not always transparent or timely (i.e. 
sometimes after the start of the current year). In addition, there is a national dispatch centre 
and city and county level dispatch centres.43 
 
Dispatch is not currently merit order based and is in need of reform. The provincial dispatch 
centre is part of the State Grid of China or China Southern Grid (whose provincial areas are 
also indicated in Figure 8). Plants are dispatched to meet demand on the basis of target 
annual running hours (+/- 1.5%), subject to priority dispatch for nuclear power plants and 
renewables44. There are also monthly dispatch plans. As discussed in Section 2 above, this 
implies that on any given day the dispatch schedule will be drawn up on the basis of the 
cumulative running hours total for the year. Fossil fuel power that are running further behind 
their target annual running hours are more likely to be dispatched first. According to China’s 
Renewable Energy Law (2010)45 all available renewable power should be dispatched first. In 
practice renewables are often constrained off by a combination of transmission constraints, a 
desire to help fossil fuel power plants meet their annual hours target and the fact the 
renewables are financially expensive (per kWh of dispatched generation). 
 
Market pilots have focused on monthly contracts for power and the incentive for generators to 
participate in such pilots is that if they sell more power in the contract market then this can be 
used to justify the need for them to be dispatched more than would otherwise be the case by 
their provincial dispatch centre. Given that allocation of annual hours often occurs after the 
start of year, holding contracts in the market can justify a higher allocation of hours.  
 
The organisation of dispatch is ripe for reform in China. In 2015 around 1.6% of power 
demand could have been met by renewable generation that was constrained off the system 
(we discuss curtailment of renewables further below). This is essentially free electricity (once 
the investment has been sunk). Academic studies suggest that efficient dispatch might 
reduce coal demand in China by up to 6% via a combination of reducing lost renewable 
output and dispatching more efficient coal fired power plants first46. What is striking is that 
dispatch savings alone are actually quite small (though they represent essentially free money 
left on the table within the existing power system). The environmental savings are large at 
0.5% of global CO2e emissions47. Coal cost savings of 6% are 1.7% of the value of total 
industrial electricity expenditure48, however the price savings would be higher if falls in coal 
marginal cost meant generally lower prices.   Not all of the theoretical savings are realisable 
once genuine transmission and system stability constraints are taken into account and the 
fact that many thermally inefficient combined heat and power plants (CHPs) must run 
because of their heating loads in winter. CHPs accounted for 19% of the total power capacity 
in 2012 (220 GW) (CEC, 2013). The most important point is that merit order dispatch 
underpins competition between power plants by massively sharpening incentives to cut 
running costs at individual plants in order to improve the probability of being dispatched. 
 
In addition, there is substantial inefficiency in regional power flows. This would be significantly 
helped by elevating the role of regional dispatch centres on the basis of least cost, as 
opposed to provincial dispatch, which favours provincial generation. 
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A current constraint in reforming dispatch is the necessary software to optimise the operation 
of the system. The current estimates are that for most provinces or regions it would take 18 
months to develop, test and implement new dispatch software. This does not seem a large 
medium term barrier. The bigger barrier is the impact on existing generator contracts, which 
are based on the expectation of sharing the available operating hours. For individual plants 
the financial impact of reallocating operating hours away from them would be substantial (e.g. 
consider two plants operating for 4000 hours on the basis of sharing hours, becoming one 
operating for 7000 hours and the other operating for 1000 hours). The impact on the large 
generators might not be substantial at the corporate level given that income would be simply 
being reallocated between plants. The fact that most of the power plants are in some form of 
state ownership (though divided between national, provincial and local governments and their 
corporate investment companies) should facilitate internal public sector reorganisations of 
asset valuations. However, some compensation would doubtless be necessary at the 
generation company level and / or between different branches of government. 
 
3.1.3 Privatisation of monopolies (4); 
 
3.1.3.1 Theoretical significance 
 
Monopoly state ownership gives rise to a number of theoretical problems for performance of 
an electricity sector (or any other state controlled sector).49 These include: arbitrary state 
interference in the operating and investment decisions of the sector; a lack of comparative 
information on performance of a given state owned firm which allows its own managers and 
controlling ministry to evaluate and incentivise its performance; a lack of comparative 
information on performance of different firms which allows external regulators or financial 
investors to evaluate and incentivise performance; a lack of clearly defined or empirically 
justifiable corporate objectives, in contrast to a profit driven private firm; lock in to other forms 
of monopoly control, such as state control of hiring of senior managers, access to capital, 
control of input purchasing decisions; exemption from or limitation of the rule of law towards 
the state owned monopoly, leading to anti-competitive behaviour, lax health and safety 
regulation and environmental regulation and weak enforcement of rules and regulations (in 
contrast to private sector firms). 
 
Privatisation of a monopoly, even without any change in the structure of the firm, immediately 
exposes the firm to competitive forces and external regulation in the capital market, labour 
market and input markets. It also reduces the scope for corruption and arbitrary sate 
interference. It generally sets up a longer run dynamic which will force a monopolist to 
improve its performance and be subject to pressure for further break-up under pressure from 
competitors and anti-trust authorities. The experience following the 1986 privatisation of 
British Gas as an un-restructured monopoly gas shipper-transmitter-distributor-retailer in 
Great Britain is an excellent example of this dynamic at work. The end point, in this case, was 
one of the most competitive wholesale (and domestic) gas markets in Europe.50 
 
3.1.3.2 General reform experience 
 
The move away from monopoly state owned enterprises in generation and transmission (e.g. 
CEGB in Great Britain, EdF in France, UES in Russia, or SEGBA in Argentina) has generally 
been accompanied by significant privatisation of existing state owned assets. The 
privatisation has often been consequent to the breakup of state owned assets into separate 
competing companies for generation and monopoly transmission companies. In addition, 
there has been significant privatisation of distribution and retail companies (which were often 
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separately constituted as municipal companies). There are well-documented cases of 
successful distribution privatisations in the UK, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Argentina.51  
 
Some jurisdictions have opted for partial privatisation. EdF remains only part privatised and 
German utilities still have significant government ownership of their stock. In the Netherlands 
the distribution companies remain largely government owned, while they have all sold their 
retail businesses. 
 
3.1.3.3 Chinese context 
 
China has had a very significant reform of its electricity sector since 1985, but state 
ownership remains pervasive throughout the whole supply chain in electricity52. There has 
been substantial entry of private and competing government owned companies into the 
electricity generation segment. However much of this entry is directed by provincial 
investment companies who themselves are pursuing non-profit objectives. Most importantly 7 
state-owned companies – the big five generators, State Grid and China Southern Grid - 
constitute around 50% of total generation (see Figure 9) and 100% of transmission, 
distribution and retailing.53 
 
Private ownership is still quite limited in scope and there remain restrictions on private 
companies entering the generation market in particular. 
 
Figure 9: 
Share of Big 5 generators in total capacity and total generation 
 
Source: Annual reports of power generation companies (2015) 
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Sources: Annual reports of power generation companies (2015) 
 
 
Privatisation remains a controversial pillar of the global electricity reform experience. Some 
studies have questioned whether it is a significant contributor to the improvement in 
performance of sector which liberalisation seeks to unlock54. However, in the context of a 
large middle-income developing country, such as China, monopoly state ownership has a 
particular constitution and represents a significant, but subtle, barrier to improved 
performance. 
 
As was evident in the history of the state owned generation and transmission monopoly in 
Great Britain (CEGB), state ownership of the electricity sector allows non-merit based 
appointments of senior managers, limits the scope of competition in the input market and 
shapes investment decisions (often disastrously) 55 . It gives rise to significant scope for 
corruption and may put a break on competition and responses to price signals even where 
ownership is dispersed between different state-owned firms. While the European single 
electricity market is characterised by much continuing partial state ownership of generation 
assets this does not impede the operation of a competitive market and severely limits the 
scope for non-market driven investment decisions. European utility reform is also filled with 
examples of state owned monopolies for which privatisation is the only reasonable solution to 
improve their performance (e.g. Network Rail and the Royal Mail in the UK56), in the face of 
the need to impose clear regulatory incentives on the access to capital for investment. 
 
Part-privatisation of the largest Chinese generating companies, or the wholesale privatisation 
of at least one of the big 5, would be a first step to significantly reducing the monopoly control 
of the central Chinese government and allowing the government to experiment with the 
benefits of loosening state control on a potentially competitive part of the electricity sector. 
 
3.2 Supportive secondary market arrangements 
3.2.1 creation of spot and ancillary services markets to support real time balancing of the 
system (5) 
 
3.2.1.1 Theoretical significance 
 
A market based electricity system involves using the pricing mechanism to price the different 
electricity products that are necessary to supply kWhs to final customers at the right quality 
(see Stoft, 2002, for a detailed discussion). A full set of markets would include: spot and 
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forward markets for real energy; and markets for frequency response, reactive power, voltage 
regulation and reserve capacity (see Figure 10 below). 
 
Spot markets reward generators for matching supply and demand in near real time. This 
typically involves day-ahead markets and intra-day (balancing markets). This gives incentives 
to generators (and to loads) to adjust their position on the basis of the general condition of the 
system and their own operating situation. Longer-term markets – such as monthly or yearly 
contract markets – offer financial hedging to generators and loads. 
 
Ancillary services are to do with maintaining power quality in real time. Traditionally these 
have been quite a small part of the electricity market in systems characterised by large fossil 
fuel based power plants. This is because these types of plants can cheaply provide ancillary 
services as by-products in the production of real energy. As power systems become more 
complex and involve more renewables the market efficiency of ancillary services provision 
becomes more important. In Great Britain ancillary services are expected to grow from 2% of 
wholesale electricity costs in 2015 to 25% by 203057. 
 
Figure 10: 
List of electricity product markets, including ancillary services products 
                                             
 
Source: Stoft (2002, p.82). 
 
 
 
Source: Stoft (2002, p.236) 
 
 
3.2.1.2 General reform experience 
 
The development of spot markets for electricity has been central to the development of 
wholesale power markets. A spot market provides the basic price signal around which all 
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futures prices can be determined. This is true in all energy based commodity markets. This is 
because spot prices can provide transparent constantly updated information and are the 
basis for the determination of longer-term contract prices. Efficient spot markets are visible to 
entrants and can give good signals on the viability of entry at any given moment. They are 
also extremely important to signalling to the demand side of the market the value of short run 
actions to reduce (or increase) power demand. 
 
Sophisticated electricity markets around the world have been developing their markets for 
ancillary services. 58  This has been because a sharpening of the incentives around the 
delivery of real energy means that power quality must be appropriately rewarded or there will 
be pressure for it to deteriorate. This is most obvious in the area of reserve capacity where 
the move towards a liberalised market means a (necessary) reduction in the holding of 
reserve capacity. If this leads to the system operating at an unacceptably high risk of a rolling 
blackout there may be a case for creating a market to specifically reward capacity (separately 
from energy). However, it is fair to say that incentives for rewarding ancillary services remain 
a patchwork of no-payment (compulsory provision), fixed payments, bilateral contracts and 
bid based markets. 
 
3.2.1.3 Chinese context 
 
Individual power plants in general receive a regulated payment for the power that they 
generate. This is a negotiated price that varies at the provincial level and is agreed with the 
local National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) on the basis of local production 
costs and socio-economic conditions. The aim is to allow a plant to recover a reasonable rate 
of return considering its costs and the number of allocated hours it is likely to run for (see Ma, 
2012). Plants are allocated hours on the basis of ‘equal share dispatch’ (see Karhl and 
William, 2014) discussed above. The current terms appear to be very generous (see Table 4 
above) and are encouraging over building of new generation capacity (see Rioux et al., 
2016). 
 
China has a coal based power generation system that has minimised the need for formal 
ancillary services markets. 59  There are some payments to generators who must run for 
system support (voltage support or reactive power) reasons, however there is, in general, no 
formal payment mechanism for ancillary services. There have been suggestions of how the 
market might be reformed in a Chinese context.60 
 
If power dispatch were to be reformed in China, the lack of formal mechanisms for procuring 
ancillary services would be more of a problem because some plants which are needed for 
ancillary services might be in danger of closing on the basis of their lack of competitiveness in 
the wholesale energy market. Hence one can envisage that reform of dispatch would require 
reform of ancillary services payments. 
 
3.2.2 participation of demand side in wholesale electricity markets (6) 
 
3.2.2.1 Theoretical significance 
 
One of the cheapest sources of power available in any electricity market is demand reduction. 
This is where some demand that would otherwise be on the system is paid to not run. This is 
a key source of flexibility in any electricity system and particularly useful in managing peak 
demand and the requirements for reserve capacity. Unlocking demand reduction is a low cost 
way of increasing competition in the market and balancing supply and demand. The 
introduction of a spot market for electricity greatly facilitates demand side participation, 
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because this is the market in which demand can most easily participate. Demand side 
participants are frequently large industrial users who can turn down or reschedule their 
production in response to system conditions. Industrial users can sign contracts with 
aggregators that pay them significant amounts per kWh of demand they reduce at peak times 
(or have signed contracts which give them otherwise cheap power, but then expose them to 
very high prices if they consume at times of annual system peak demand). With the 
emergence of distributed electrical energy storage the capacity for industrial and commercial 
loads to further manage their interaction with the wholesale market will increase. 
 
3.2.2.2 General reform experience 
 
 
Table 5: 
Demand participation in liberalised markets 
 
Texas 
ERCOT 
Great Britain 
National Grid 
US 
PJM 
DSR as % of Peak 3.20% 3.60% 9.10% 
 
Source: Khalid et al (2016, p.3) 
 
Demand side participation has been very significant in competitive power markets (see Table 
5)61 in that there have been many occasions where there would been blackouts if there had 
not been active demand side participation in wholesale power markets (in Great Britain there 
have been several incidents of demand side participation helping the system cope with 
extreme system conditions).  
 
Demand side participation has been very important in ancillary services markets. Most 
recently capacity markets in both the US and Great Britain have seen significant price 
reducing impacts from the inclusion of the demand side in the market.  
 
3.2.2.3 Chinese context 
 
One of the limitations on demand participation is that domestic and high value commercial 
loads are more expensive to incentivise to reduce or shift their demand (per kWh of demand 
reduction). This implies that deindustrialising economies such as in the US and Great Britain 
have smaller easier to shift industrial loads over time. This is not the current situation of 
China, as shown in Figure 11, where 71% of power demand is from industry (as opposed to 
only 26% in the US). This suggests a high potential for demand side response in China. 62 
 
 
Figure 11: 
Sources of electricity demand in China and the US 
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Source: NBS (2015) 
 
                                           
 
 
Source: EIA (2015) 
 
 
Projections from Shanghai and the actual experience of Jiangsu suggest a significant and 
rising percentage of peak demand response as shown in Table 6. In Jiangsu province, the 
grid companies and related governmental agencies launched a demand-side management 
pilot project in the summer of 2016. 3154 households participated in this DSR pilot project 
that saw a peak demand reduction of 3.8 % (the equivalent of 3,520 MW)63.       
 
Table 6: 
The potential for demand response in Shanghai and Jiangsu in selected years 
 
 
Jiangsu-2016 Shanghai-2020 Shanghai-2025 Shanghai-2030 
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DSR as % of Peak 3.8% 1.68% 3.04% 4.09% 
 
Source: The data on Shanghai are from Liu et al. (2015, p.16), and the data of Jiangsu are 
from http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jjyx/dzxqcgl/201607/t20160727_812571.html 
. 
 
It is important to point out that demand response depends on customers being subject to 
sophisticated metering which can measure their consumption, when they are meant to be 
offering demand response. In Yunnan, in 2015, only half of all industrial customers had got 
meters capable of allowing them to participate in a spot market. It also needs to be case that 
the demands themselves are subject to market based incentives for their output otherwise 
they may have an incentive to game their participation in demand side response by 
deliberately running their equipment ahead of an instruction to reduce their demand. 
 
3.2.3 regulated third party access to, and efficient allocation of scarce transmission capacity 
(7) 
 
3.2.3.1 Theoretical significance 
 
Transmission capacity is a scarce resource. 64  This is because transmission system 
investments are large and eventually it becomes difficult to expand transmission capacity as a 
result of objections from the communities through which they pass (and who do not benefit 
directly from them). Because of loop flows in meshed electricity networks and constraints 
within the distribution system to which they are connected, transmission building to solve one 
constraint may create other constraints and vulnerabilities. Building appropriate transmission 
capacity in the face of rapid growth of generation or loads in some areas (rather than others) 
often gives rise to transmission constraints in developing countries. Transmission capacity 
can often only be added in significant sized increments, meaning that until the next 
incremental expansion of capacity comes along there will necessarily be constraints within 
the transmission system. Every advanced country in the world has had difficulty in expanding 
transmission capacity beyond a certain point.  
 
This suggests that a system for allocating the available transmission capacity is necessary. 
This is important when the cheapest generation sources are a long way from the largest and 
most valuable loads. Allocating transmission capacity among generators and loads in an 
efficient way and providing signals for where to expand the transmission system next are 
important elements of a reformed electricity system. The allocation of capacity among 
generators and loads should be non-discriminatory. This is important in countries where 
transmission capacity is still owned by an incumbent generator, to prevent unfair access 
terms reducing competition in the wholesale market. 
 
One way to indicate where the constraints are in the transmission system is to use short run 
price signals at every node in the transmission system – locational marginal prices (LMPs) – 
which indicate a different price for wholesale power between export (lower) and import 
(higher) constrained nodes.65 This provides signals to switch off high cost generators and 
lower value loads in export constrained areas and switch off high cost loads and switch on 
higher cost generators in import constrained areas. Those using the transmission system 
have to pay the differences between LMPs at each end of a line to use the system in the 
direction that the power is flowing. 
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Another way to do this is to allocate transmission system costs by location such that 
generators connecting in export constrained areas face higher use of system charges than 
generators connecting in import constrained areas and vice-versa for loads.66 
 
Both of these methods help make good use of the existing transmission system and signal 
the value of transmission system expansion on the basis of the modelled reduction in 
constraint related payments. 
 
3.2.3.2 General reform experience 
 
Non-discriminatory access to the transmission system based on regulated third party access 
has been a central element of power market reform as countries have moved away from 
integrated generation and transmission utilities. There are well documented cases where 
continuing integration of generation and transmission did lead to preferential access being 
given to incumbent generators by their transmission business (e.g. in Chile). This resulted in 
long running competition disputes. 67  The EU stated that ownership unbundling of 
transmission from generation with regulated third party access (a single set of access prices) 
was its preferred model for the organisation of the transmission system. 
 
Allocation of transmission capacity has been largely done on the basis of published tariffs 
with firm transmission rights (guaranteed access). This results in compensation being paid in 
the event that generators or loads have to reduce their supply or demand due to transmission 
constraints. In Great Britain such firm transmission rights do come with the locational signals 
in the use of system charges for connecting generation in demand constrained parts of the 
network and vice versa. Independent system operators (ISOs) in the US mainly use LMPs to 
optimise the use of the transmission system in real time and then allow the trading of financial 
transmission rights (FTRs)68 allocated to incumbents every six months that allow transmission 
system users to hedge their exposure to LMPs. 
 
For significant transmission links, such as long distance HVDC lines in the US 69 or 
international transmission links in Europe 70 , capacity is auctioned and this is a way of 
efficiently allocating the capacity among users. However, such congestion-based 
mechanisms for charging do not guarantee that the fixed costs of the line will be recovered 
and hence additional charges will be almost certainly be needed. 
 
3.2.3.3 Chinese context 
 
Table 7: 
Expansion of Chinese transmission and distribution grid 
 
Type Voltage 2014 2013 2012 
AC (km) 
l000kV 3111 1936 639 
750kV 13881 12666 10088 
500kV 152107 146166 137104 
330kV 25146 24065 22701 
220kV 358377 339075 318217 
110kV 566571 545815 517983 
35kV 484296 464525 456168 
Total 1603489 1534248 1462900 
DC(km) 800KV 10132 6904 5314 
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660KV 1336 1400 1400 
500KV 11875 10653 9145 
400KV 1640 1031 1031 
Total 24983 19988 16890 
 
Source: China Electricity Council (2015) 
 
Recently China has been rapidly building generation capacity, expanding power demand and 
building new transmission lines. It has invested significantly in HVDC links 71. The rapid 
expansion of the high voltage grid can be seen in Table 7. The allocation of the capacity 
within the transmission system in China is rather underdeveloped. Thus some significant 
capacity remains underutilised (e.g. between Yunnan and Guangdong) and other lines are 
not being allocated efficiently (e.g. to renewables from low cost regions). This suggests that 
some reform of the pricing and allocation mechanisms around transmission capacity would be 
beneficial and would be in line with other reforms to dispatch and wholesale power markets. 
 
Under the current system of charging final customers transmission and distribution charges 
have not be separately identifiable, even for the largest customers. This is because both final 
customer and generation prices have been regulated by the government. Unit charges have 
varied for different customers connected at different voltage levels (as would be suggested by 
optimal allocation of fixed costs between customers). Recently the government has moved 
away from per unit charging to introducing fixed fees for some large industrial customers.72 
Under the recent market trials transmission/distribution network charges at the provincial level 
have been identified. However these new transmission and distribution charges in China are 
cost plus and do not incorporate location or time of use signals of the longer run or real time 
condition of the network. Generators do not bear any of the costs of transmission system 
(unlike in some systems such as the UK) and rely on curtailment and regulated energy prices 
to signal advantageous locations for connection. Reforming the charging for transmission to 
better allocate the available capacity would seem to be advantageous especially in signalling 
where to locate renewables, build new transmission capacity and which generation plants 
should run in constrained areas of the network. 
 
3.3 Appropriate economic regulation 
3.3.1 unbundling of regulated network charges and competitive segment charges (8) 
 
3.3.1.1 Theoretical significance 
 
It was Joskow and Schmalensee (1983) who definitively pointed out (following Weiss, 1975) 
that wholesale generation and retail service were potentially competitive elements within the 
largely vertically integrated US electricity power industry. Only transmission and distribution 
networks - which provide the transport capacity to the electricity system - have the 
characteristics of natural monopolies. Even then distribution networks are local monopolies 
and multiple distribution systems can co-exist within a single country providing the ability of 
regulators to benchmark these local natural monopolies against one another using yardstick 
competition (following Shleifer, 1985). Transmission monopolies can exploit economies of 
scale over larger areas and over individual lines, but the wide area natural monopoly is 
actually in system operation rather than the ownership and operation of lines themselves. 
Thus in many parts of the US transmission ownership is actually dispersed among local 
companies, while system operation (such as in PJM) is conducted over a wide area. 
 
Such a separation between transmission and distribution networks and the rest of the system 
allows pricing mechanisms to be clearly distinguished. Prices for wholesale and final retail 
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charges can be competitively determined, while both the level and structure of distribution 
and transmission charges continue to be regulated monopoly charges. Attention can be paid 
to ensuring that such charges are non-discriminatory, that is they do not favour any particular 
user of the network on the basis of their ownership characteristics, in particular whether they 
are part of the same company that owns the transmission and distribution system. 
 
3.3.1.2 General reform experience 
 
The increasingly strict unbundling of transmission and distribution charges from charges for 
wholesale and retail elements of electricity supply has been a key element of both the 
successful creation of competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets around the world. In 
the UK transmission and distribution network ownership was unbundled from generation 
ownership at the time of privatisation. At the level of the EU successive electricity directives 
(1996, 1999 and 2003) required accounting and legal unbundling of the network elements 
from the rest of the system.73 This meant that transmission and distribution businesses must 
be created within companies that remain integrated with generation and retail. Transmission 
and distribution must be legally unbundled from each other within the EU. The EU has 
expressed a preference for the ownership unbundling of transmission from the rest of the 
electricity system, given the key role that non-discriminatory access to the transmission plays 
in promoting retail competition. As we discussed earlier, strict separation promotes a level 
playing field in the competitive segments of the electricity supply industry. 
 
A significant share of the total benefit of liberalisation arises in the network businesses 
themselves. A key success of the separation of network and competitive elements in many 
countries has proved to be the ability to introduce incentive regulation of the network 
businesses. This has involved CPI-X regulation of the revenue of network companies, with 
formulae set in advance for several years (usually 3-5 years). This has resulted in very 
significant improvements in the efficiency of operation of the network companies. In the UK 
perhaps one third of the overall gain from the liberalisation process came from improved 
regulation of the network companies, rather than competition per se (see Littlechild, 2006 and 
Pollitt, 2012).  
 
3.3.1.3 Chinese context 
 
The power sector reform of 2002 resulted in a very significant set of measures aimed at 
separating networks from competitive elements. This did result in separation of generation 
from the rest of the power system. However, as we have already observed transmission, 
distribution and retail remain bundled within State Grid and China Southern Grid 74 . 
Generation is under contract to supply the Grid companies with power to supply their final 
customers. This is a form of single buyer model, which was used in the early days of power 
market reform in some countries. It was an option under the 1996 electricity directive in the 
EU. This model has now been discontinued in the EU (for fossil fuel generation) in favour of 
competitive wholesale power markets to determine the price of bulk power. 
 
Recently several provinces (including Guangdong) have announced network access charges 
which generators need to pay to use the transmission and distribution system to competitively 
sell power to final customers75. These charges are based on the identification of a regulatory 
asset base for transmission and distribution assets within the province and the calculation of 
what charges would allow the relevant grid company to recover a fair return on this asset 
base while covering its costs. The charges that have been announced are fixed for three 
years. This would seem to give some incentives for the grid company to cut its network costs 
and keep the savings. 
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The move towards stricter separation of network and competitive elements within the power 
system in China is to be encouraged. For China to bring itself in line with international best 
practice, there must be strict accounting and legal separation of transmission, distribution and 
retail businesses. Such strict unbundling would allow the publication of data on network 
company costs and facilitate independent comparative benchmarking of regulated network 
businesses, which is currently very difficult to do on the basis of the high level horizontally 
and vertically integrated business data that is available on China State Grid and China 
Southern Grid at the moment. This will greatly facilitate non-discriminatory access charging 
for the use of the distribution and transmission system. It will also allow incentive regulation of 
transmission and distribution to be introduced. An obvious way forward is to compare 
distribution and transmission costs at the provincial level and use benchmarking to compare 
costs and set the efficient level of revenue for the transmission and distribution elements. 
Setting a CPI-X price cap for 3 years is a good start and does allow some differences in 
performance to emerge quickly, before moving to setting the price controls for longer periods 
(in the UK, this was initially 5 years for distribution and 4 years for transmission, later 5 years 
for both and now 8 years for both). Regulation of investment is also important, given the high 
rates of investment in networks in recent years. There is currently a lack of incentives to limit 
these investments, in contrast to jurisdictions with incentive regulation where sophisticated 
audits and menu regulation have been developed to limit overinvestment by monopoly 
network companies.76 
 
3.3.2 mechanisms to ensure competitive procurement of wholesale power for regulated 
final customer groups (9) 
 
3.3.2.1 Theoretical significance 
 
Unless all of the retail market is liberalised there will continue to be significant numbers of 
customers who are on regulated final tariffs. If this is the case these customers need to be 
supplied with wholesale power, which has been procured on a competitive basis. This is 
because if they are not, this will significantly reduce the degree of competition in the 
wholesale market. There is no reason why all retailers should not procure their power 
competitively in the wholesale market, whatever the basis of the final contracts that they need 
to offer to customers in the regulated retail price market.77 
 
3.3.2.2 General reform experience 
 
Most countries across the world that have competitive wholesale power markets also have 
regulated final tariff customers. This is case in half of all EU countries (see ACER, 2014), 
most of the US and all of South America. These customers are the default service contract 
customers in the US and the EU and most of the final household customers in South America 
who are still on regulated final tariffs. In all of these cases the procurement of the power to 
supply these protected customers is done on a competitive basis.  
 
This is achieved by the regulator specifying the basis of the contract for bulk power that it 
allows to be passed through to the regulated final customers. In Italy, the regulator specifies a 
default mark-up formula for residential customers 78. This is based on regulated mark-up 
competitively acquired wholesale electricity79. 
 
In the US the wholesale power contract to supply default service customers within a particular 
distribution company area is often auctioned and the auction price then used to price the 
wholesale cost element of the default service bill that residential customers are charged.80 
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3.3.2.3 Chinese context 
 
Currently, the two large Grid companies procure power at regulated prices for all their 
customers81. The final prices that they can charge and the prices that they pay for wholesale 
power are regulated. It is highly likely, and in line with international experience, that China will 
want significant numbers of customers to continue to enjoy regulated tariffs for the 
foreseeable future. This is particularly true in the residential sector where customers are 
currently paying below the full economic cost of their service82. If Chinese residential prices 
were raised to US levels this would allow industrial prices to be reduced by up to 5%.83 
Indeed, there are no plans to liberalise the market for residential customers in this round of 
reforms. This may be because of a debate among senior policy makers about whether 
electricity is a commodity (which should be priced to reflect costs) or a public service (which 
should continue to be cross-subsidised).84 
 
The continuing presence of default service customers does not mean that there needs to be 
anything less than full competition in the wholesale market for power. This can be achieved 
by moving to competitive procurement for wholesale power from fossil fuel power plants. 
Such a mechanism could also be used to introduce regular cost based updating of retail 
prices on the basis of changes in underlying power procurement costs. This would be the 
basis for gradually raising retail prices, as incomes continue to grow, towards fully cost 
reflective levels. Clearly identifying the procurement costs associated with default service 
customers, combined with separate network charging, would also clearly identify the level of 
the subsidy that these customers are currently receiving. This would have the additional 
advantage of focussing regulatory attention on how this might be reduced over time. 
 
3.3.3 the creation of independent regulatory agencies to regulate monopoly network charges 
and monitor competitive segments (10) 
 
3.3.3.1 Theoretical significance 
 
Competitive wholesale and retail markets need to be monitored carefully to ensure that they 
are working properly. This is because they are creations from incumbent monopolies and 
exhibit natural tendencies to re-integrate. This implies that it is unlikely that a general 
competition authority will be nimble enough to confront all of the many competition issues that 
are likely to arise, especially in the early years following liberalisation. In addition, substantial 
regulated monopolies remain in the sector. These need to be regulated as to the level and 
distribution of their charges and the quality of service that they are offering to both their retail 
and generation customers wishing to use their networks. Such regulation is a substantial task 
and requires detailed knowledge of the cost structures of the industry and attention to the 
incentive effects of any financial controls that are put in place. These two facts, suggest that 
in line with other significant utility industries (telecoms, gas, rail and water) a dedicated 
regulatory body may be best placed to ensure society’s continuing interest in these sectors. 
 
The institutional form of such a regulatory body can be debated and depends to some extent 
on the size and competence of state in which it is situated. It could be merged with other 
regulated industries (such as in Germany within the Bundesnetzagentur), involve both 
national and sub-national bodies (such as with Federal Electricity Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) and the state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) in the US), be a division of the 
competition authority (as in the Netherlands with the DTe being merged into the NMa) or 
involve a separate electricity regulator (e.g. ANEEL in Brazil) or a combined electricity and 
gas supply regulator (e.g. Ofgem in Great Britain). 
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In most countries with liberalised power markets, the regulatory body tasked with overseeing 
competition and monopoly regulation is independent of day-to-day central government control 
in the sense that it is a non-ministerial government department, where the relevant 
government ministry (of energy) has limited powers of intervention during the term of office of 
the board members of the regulatory body. Both the World Bank and the EU have strongly 
endorsed this approach to regulation85. This is because a key problem in liberalised network 
industries is one of regulatory appropriation (see Gilbert and Newbery, 1994). This occurs 
when governments have the incentive to encourage private companies to invest and then to 
force them to reduce prices after investment has occurred in order to ‘appropriate’ a greater 
share of the benefits from investors to customers. ‘Independent’ regulation is primarily aimed 
at balancing the rights of shareholders to return with the rights of consumers to fair (i.e. 
reflective of competitive cost levels) prices. 
 
3.3.3.2  General reform experience 
 
The experience of liberalised markets is that independent regulators have supported private 
investment in liberalised power markets, have had significant roles in monitoring day-to-day 
competition issues and have made significant progress in developing network regulation. The 
role of Offer (the GB electricity regulator from 1990-1999) and then Ofgem (the electricity and 
gas regulator from 1999) have been very significant in the Great Britain context. The 
presence of a regulatory body with an appointed regulator (and then regulatory board) with 
statutory duties (in particular, to promote competition) gave investors confidence that the 
government would not arbitrarily intervene to reduce prices.  
 
This resulted in significant new investment in the industry in the years following privatisation 
and eventually significant foreign investment in the sector (which saw the assets being sold at 
a large premium to oversees investors). It also resulted in close regulatory oversight of the 
process of competition in the early years (see Newbery, 2005) that did eventually result in 
competition authority enforcement action (sanctioned by Ofgem) to further break-up the 
incumbent generators. Offer and Ofgem developed very sophisticated and successful 
incentive regulation of network companies which saw the level of real charges fall nearly 60% 
in distribution and 40% in transmission between 1990 and 2005 (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 
2007, and Ofgem, 2009). These results have been mirrored elsewhere and Cubbin and Stern 
(2005) found significant investment benefits in electricity resulting from privatisation and 
independent regulation across a sample of countries, many of which had previously suffered 
from chronic under-investment in electricity infrastructure. 
 
A particular success of the regulator in the UK has been to counteract the power of incumbent 
companies in the sector. This was greatly facilitated by the breakup of the incumbent 
generator and the separation of the transmission network company from the rest of the 
system. The regulator has been a consistent advocate for introducing more competition, for 
instance in the procurement of network assets, and for changes to network and industry rules 
which increase costs for customers. The regulator has also been a significant source of 
learning in the sector as problems have been revealed and dealt with and new issues have 
come to light as the reform has progressed. 
 
Many developing countries have set up nominally independent regulatory agencies for 
electricity. These often suffer from a lack of genuine political will to leave the sector to be 
overseen by the regulator and a lack of resources on the part of the regulatory agency to 
effectively enforce competition and network regulation (see Pollitt and Stern, 2009). 
Regulatory agencies in many countries need a combination of well-trained economists, 
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lawyers and accountants to adequately undertake economic regulation. Low civil service pay 
in competition with relatively well-resourced incumbent companies make it difficult to attract 
high quality staff with relevant industry knowledge and experience to work in regulatory 
agencies in many countries. 
 
3.3.3.3 Chinese context 
 
Figure 12: 
Current structure of regulatory bodies overseeing the Chinese electricity sector 
 
 
Notes: Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), National Development and Reform 
Council (NDRC), State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS), National Energy Association 
(NEA), State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). 
Source: Tan and Zhao (2016).  
 
As suggested by Figure 12, Chinese regulatory oversight of the electricity is complicated.86 
There was an attempt to create a separate economic regulator in 2003 within the NEA (the 
Electricity Regulatory Commission) to oversee competition and pricing, but this was merged 
back in to the NEA. Determination of regulated final prices and the prices paid to generators 
is currently split between the provincial and national Pricing Departments of the NDRC, which 
is the government department that oversees economic reform across the whole economy. 
None of the bodies (in Figure 12) has exclusive power over coordinating the electricity 
policies and none want to be coordinated by others. Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to 
balance the actions of different government agencies. One consequence of this is that the 
energy policy for the 12th Five-Year plan (2011-15) did not come out until 2013.87 
 
China does not have a tradition of independent regulation and even in the telecoms sector 
(where, internationally, deregulation is normally more advanced than energy) there is no 
regulator separate from the Ministry of Communications88. The situation is complicated by the 
continuing state ownership of most of the electricity supply sector and the role of the State 
Asset Holding Company 89 . However there has been some success in recent years in 
improving the functioning of the general competition authority in China, which has become 
more active in monitoring and enforcing competition across the economy 90 . Section 7, 
Paragraph 2 of China’s Anti-monopoly Law does cover SOEs and prohibits the their abuse of 
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dominant positions. However, the law also protects SOEs that ‘implicate national economic 
vitality and national security’ and hence there is a limitation to the extent to which current anti-
monopoly legislation covers large SOEs in the electricity sector. Anti-monopoly enforcement 
activities in China are currently split between three branches of government (see Figure 13), 
but there is some evidence that the Anti-monopoly Enforcement capability of the Chinese 
government is increasing. This would be potentially important if the role of the market is 
extended in electricity, as it has been in advanced countries.91 
 
 
 
Figure 13: 
Anti-monopoly institutions in China 
 
Source: Slaughter and May (2016, p.2) 
 
Regulators can only be as effective as the quality (and quantity) of the staff that they have. 
Civil service pay remains relatively low in China and this is a problem in recruiting and 
retaining staff to undertake regulatory functions. There is evidence that salaries in 
government remain low relative to those in the SOEs that they regulate (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8: 
Evidence on civil service pay in China relative to state owned companies 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Electricity, gas and  
water utilities 121  140  161  185  218  
Public sector 100  113  132  147  181  
Notes: Public sector in 2003 = 100   
Source: Chan and Ma (2011, p.305) 
 
A well-resourced economic regulator is an essential part of a successful on-going reform of 
the electricity sector in China. FERC in the US has 1500 employees (working on electricity 
and gas) working at the Federal level, with significant additional numbers in the State PUCs. 
Ofgem in Great Britain has 907 employees (for a population of 58m).  
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How to ensure the independence of this regulatory agency in a Chinese context is 
challenging, given the lack of experience in China with independent regulation. One solution 
is to incorporate the electricity regulator into the general competition authority to begin with. 
This would have the advantage of strengthening both functions of the authority and allowing 
for the initial focus to be on promoting competition (which is the key thrust of the No. 9 
Document).  
 
Another way forward would be to create an independent regulator with board members 
appointed for 5 years and use this as a test case for reforming utility sectors in China.  These 
board members should be from a mixture of backgrounds and consist of both executive and 
non-executive members of the regulatory agency. 
 
The prize from getting incentive regulation of the electricity distribution network in China is 
large. Consider the Figure 14 below: 
 
 
Figure 14: 
International comparison of impact of reform on labour productivity in electricity 
distribution and transmission 
 
Notes: The six companies from Peru in this figure are Electro Sur Medio, Electrolima ,Edelnor, 
Luz del Sur, Ede Chancay and Ede Cañete. 
CSG = China Southern Grid; SGCC = State Grid Corporation of China. 
 
Sources: Anaya (2010), China Electricity Council (2015), Domah and Pollitt (2001), Mota 
(2003), National Grid Electricity Transmission Report and Accounts, Pollitt (2004 & 2008). 
 
In Great Britain, between liberalisation in 1990 and 1998 employment dropped 43% and 
labour productivity in electricity transmission and distribution improved over 100%. Given that 
China State Grid and China Southern Grid have 2m employees, the savings in unit labour 
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costs are significant (conservatively) estimated at $8.7bn p.a. or 2.1% of industrial customer 
expenditure, thus prices could be reduced by of the order of 2-3%. 92 Not all of the total 
number of employees are involved in the electricity supply business, a significant number are 
in other activities, potentially reducing the scope for rationalisation.93  
 
According to an NEA regulation report, there is also a problem around grid asset depreciation 
in China’s grid accounting, which can be seen as a strategy to inflate current costs (and 
charges). For example, the official depreciation period of one transmission line belonging to 
Guizhou grid is 17 years, however, the actual depreciation period is less than five years.194 
Transmission assets are typically depreciated over 40 years or more in EU countries. Rapid 
depreciation of new assets in an expanding system raises measured costs and hence prices. 
Proper regulation of grid asset accounting and their translation into electricity prices, might 
produce further significant savings for industrial electricity customers. 
 
3.4 Efficient promotion of low emission technologies 
3.4.1 competitive procurement processes for low carbon generation, with some exposure to 
wholesale price variability (11) 
 
3.4.1.1 Theoretical significance 
 
Low carbon generation is, mostly, not currently financially cost competitive with electricity 
produced from fossil fuels. This implies that if governments want to support low carbon 
generation they need to find ways to implicitly (e.g. by banning fossil fuel use) or explicitly 
subsidise it (e.g. by making use of feed-in tariffs). There are two good economic reasons to 
subsidise low carbon generation in the face of competition with fossil fuel based generation. 
First, because it is in its relative infancy and hence has not benefited from the cumulative 
learning that fossil fuel technologies have enjoyed, subsidies can be justified because of their 
future learning benefits 95. Second, because fossil fuels produce environmental pollutants, 
such as particulates, acid rain and carbon dioxide, clean low carbon technologies can justify 
additional financial support, which reflects the value of reducing these pollutants. A further 
problem of low carbon generation is that because of the nature of the cash flows associated 
with such investments – high upfront costs and lower future running costs, relative to fossil 
fuels. This means that long-term power purchase contracts are more valuable for low carbon 
generation in order to reduce the cost of capital and improve the relative net present value 
(NPV) of low carbon investments.  
 
These reasons suggest that long term fixed prices for low carbon generation may be needed 
to help them earn a return at the current stage of their technological development. This is true 
for both new technologies such as solar PV and onshore and offshore wind and also for 
established low carbon technologies such as hydro and nuclear. 
 
Just because low carbon generation must be subsidised relative to fossil fuel generation does 
not mean it cannot be procured via a competitive process. Clearly it is theoretically desirable 
to minimise the subsidy costs of a given MWh of clean electricity. This can be done by a 
suitably designed procurement auction, of the type that we describe below. 
 
Another problem that must be addressed is the fact that electricity is more valuable at certain 
times of the day, week and season. This argues against simple fixed price contracts for MWh, 
which do not vary the price paid with the relative value of the power to the system. A way                                                               
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should be found to give more of an incentive for renewable generation to respond to the 
supply and demand factors that should drive wholesale power prices. This can be done by a 
contract for difference (CfD) with the government that guarantees a top-up payment based on 
average wholesale prices, or via a premium FIT where the low carbon generation participates 
fully in the wholesale market and receives the market price plus a premium set by the 
government (rather than just a fixed price). 
 
3.4.1.2  General reform experience 
 
While many countries have had fixed feed-in tariffs per MWh, a number have used 
competitive procurement methods to support low carbon generation, with some exposure to 
real time price volatility. The most common method is to use Tradable Green Certificates 
(TGCs)96. This involves requiring suppliers to source a percentage of their electricity from 
‘green’ sources by presenting certificates to show that they have done this. Certificates are 
created when low carbon generators produce a MWh of electricity. This creates a market for 
TGCs, which trade at a positive price and provide an additional source of revenue for low 
carbon generators97. This exposes the generators to the real time electricity price and if the 
certificate market is competitive the price of certificates will reflect the lowest cost way of 
reaching the target percentage. Such schemes exist in many US states (e.g. New York). One 
issue with the scheme is when the target percentage is too ambitious and there is a shortage 
of certificates that leads to a penalty price binding. This has consistently happened in the UK 
with the result that the value of the certificates rises to the penalty price, which may be overly 
generous98. 
 
Procurement auctions allowing the acquisition of low carbon electricity have also been used 
in the UK and the US. These have been very successful in reducing the price paid for low 
carbon electricity. The UK had an auction to supply low carbon generation from renewables 
which saw the price paid for on-shore wind and solar PV fall dramatically relative to the 
previously published administratively determined prices (of the order of 20%). The auction 
was for a 15 year CfD99. The US has made of auctions, particularly for the procurement of 
small-scale renewables. A good example is the successive rounds of the Renewable Auction 
Mechanism (RAM) in California that has also seen significant reductions in auction prices for 
projects of 3-20 MW. These auctions are for fixed prices (not CfDs) but do have up to 50 non-
payment hours per year, which means that the incumbent distribution company can curtail the 
generator off the system when it is not in the interests of the system to run the plant100. 
 
3.4.1.3 Chinese experience101 
 
In China renewables and nuclear power are paid fixed prices per MWh, with the prices being 
determined at the provincial level in discussions between the NRDC and local government.102 
There is a national renewables target (which includes nuclear) for the percentage of overall 
generation that is to come from renewables by the end of the 13th 5-year plan period and 
there are targets for the amount of new nuclear power that the system wishes to add. There 
are provincial level non-hydro renewable electricity shares for 2020 (see Table 9).  
 
Table 9: 
Target share of non-hydro renewable energy in total electricity consumption in 2020 
Province Non-hydro renewable 
 share 
Province Non-hydro renewable 
 share 
Beijing 10% Hubei 7% 
Tianjing 10% Hunan 7% 
Hebei 10% Guangdong 7% 
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Shanxi 10% Guangxi 5% 
Inner Mongolia 13% Hainan 10% 
Liaoning 13% Chongqin 5% 
Jilin 13% Sichuan 5% 
Heilongjiang 13% Guizhou 5% 
Shanghai 5% Yunnan 10% 
Jiangsu 7% Tibet 13% 
Zhejiang 7% Shaanxi 10% 
Anhui 7% Gansu 13% 
Fujian 7% Qinghai 10% 
Jiangxi 5% Ningxia 13% 
Shandong 10% Xinjiang 13% 
Henan 7% Total 9% 
Source: NEA website.  
Available at: http://zfxxgk.nea.gov.cn/auto87/201603/t20160303_2205.htm. 
 
However, individual provinces may wish to add renewables and nuclear for GDP growth 
target reasons or because of local preferences for clean energy (usually driven by favourable 
weather conditions for renewables). 
 
Renewables and nuclear power are not subject to either competitive procurement or direct 
exposure to wholesale prices. Indeed, renewables are often constrained off the system by 
grid constraints or the desire to meet the contractual running hours targets of large fossil fuel 
power plants. As noted above, this is because reducing the hours that renewable generation 
runs reduces system cost, given the subsidy. This suggests that renewable feed-in tariffs do 
not currently reflect society’s willingness to pay for renewables (but lie above this). 
 
Competitive procurement of renewables to set the price paid to renewables would seem to be 
desirable for two reasons. First, it removes the negotiated price element that seems to result 
in higher prices than society is actually willing to pay for renewables. Second, competitive 
procurement is a firmer contractual commitment, in that that improving grid access for 
renewables will directly reduce the prices in the procurement auction.  
 
There is a need for experimentation with competitive procurement as this would be an 
unusual process for the government to use to achieve its objectives in an industry dominated 
by state owned enterprises. There are many companies in the generation sector and there is 
clearly a lot of opportunity for competitive bidding should the auctions be carefully designed to 
deliver a competitive outcome. Auctions over wider areas (several provinces) and across 
different technologies (wind and solar) will highlight the value of location and of different 
technologies in ways that the current technology and provincially differentiated tariffs do not. 
Currently none of the market pilot projects involve experimenting with the competitive 
procurement of renewables. There would seem to be clear opportunity for a pilot project in 
renewables procurement. The Chinese government has recently announced an intention to 
introduce a new tradeable green certificate scheme form July 2017103. 
 
According to Chinese official statistics, under collection of renewable levies has led to an 
accumulated deficit in the renewable payments fund that has, in turn, delayed payments to 
renewable generators. This payment deficit grew to 50 billion RMB in January 2017104. 
 
3.4.2 cost reflective access terms for renewables (12) 
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3.4.2.1 Theoretical significance 
 
The location of renewables is a particular issue because while fossil fuel plants can be 
located close to load centres or where transmission capacity is readily available, renewables 
need to be located where the underlying resources are available. An electricity system with a 
high penetration of renewables is one where concentrations of loads and generators are often 
separated by great distances, and where small-scale renewables may be located across the 
network. Given that the cost of delivering power is a combination of its generation cost and its 
transportation cost, the pricing of the transportation element faced by generators is very 
important.  
 
Locational signals on where to connect renewables into the electricity grid are complicated by 
the fact that renewables are currently subsidised. This means that locational signals may 
penalise the connection of renewables in places where generation conditions are very 
favourable (i.e. remote areas which are windy and/or sunny). This produces the counter 
intuitive result that we would be prepared to pay more for a MWh of wind or solar power 
generated where conditions are less favourable than where conditions are more favourable. 
 
3.4.2.2 General reform experience 
 
Many international jurisdictions have chosen to pay renewables the same per MWh 
regardless of location and not to expose them to differential connection charges that reflect 
the costs to the system of connecting them in particular locations. Indeed, most electricity 
systems simply socialise the costs of offering firm connection (100% guaranteed export 
capacity) to renewable generators, so that renewable generators only pay for their direct 
connection costs (the works to physically connect them to the existing grid or so called 
‘shallow’ connection costs). 
 
This is now beginning to change as renewables shares increase significantly in some 
jurisdictions. The RAM auctions in California rank projects after including the costs to the 
transmission system of absorbing a given project105 (see Anaya and Pollitt, 2015). In the UK 
renewable generators do pay a share of the upgrade costs to the system of their connection 
(they have to pay to be connected at an unconstrained part of the network or bear the costs 
of upgrading the first substation to which they would be connected, so called shallowish 
connection costs). The Flexible Plug and Play project in the UK offered non-firm connection to 
generators in return for paying shallow connection charges and exposing them to the risk of 
interruption. For small renewables projects embedded in a distribution system built only to 
supply loads this resulted in significant total project cost savings106 (Anaya and Pollitt, 2015). 
 
Signalling where to connect and exposing renewables to the system cost of their connection 
to constrained parts of the network is in its infancy. Given the intermittent nature of 
renewables and the high fixed costs of renewables projects (which means that maximising 
MWhs supplied is important) and the high fixed costs of offering firm grid export capacity to 
renewables this would seem to be important. 
 
3.4.2.3 Chinese experience 
 
The Chinese power grid is already under significant stress even with relatively low penetration 
of intermittent (i.e. non-hydro) renewables (see Figure 15 shows major long distance power 
flows in 2013). The potential for long distance power flows is significantly increasing as the 
volume of renewables grows. Renewable resources are significantly located in the north and 
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west, a long way from the demand centres in the east and south107. This suggests significant 
value in small scale renewables located close to loads. 
 
Figure 15: 
Map of major power flows in 2013 (TWh) 
 
Source: Ming et al. (2016, p.576) 
 
At the moment generators are not directly exposed to price signals that indicate the value of 
their connection to the network at particular locations. They are indirectly exposed to this via 
their exposure to curtailment. As this curtailment is arbitrary it is not clear that this properly 
signals the true value of connection at particular parts of the network108. 
 
Network costs are significant in China and have the potential to rise further. There is, 
currently, a desire to build out all the constraints in the electricity network and accommodate 
the projected generation capacity. However, this looks challenging in the face of sustained 
growth in demand and the increasing use of renewable generation (and indeed fossil 
generation) located further from loads. Offering efficient connection signals to renewables 
would seem to be as valuable, if not more valuable, than other countries given the scales 
involved. 
 
This suggests that renewable generators should be exposed to some locational signals that 
indicate the value of their connection at particular locations. This could involve a combination 
10.81
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16.65
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of zonal payments for annual connection capacity to the transmission system for transmission 
connected generation (following zonal transmission charges in the UK)109 and contributions to 
distribution system upgrade costs for distribution connected generation that wants higher 
guaranteed export capacity from the grid110. 
 
3.4.3 appropriate pricing of environmental externalities (both carbon dioxide and other 
atmospheric pollutants, such as sulphur dioxide) (13) 
 
3.4.3.1 Theoretical significance 
 
The production of electricity from fossil fuels is associated with significant environmental 
externalities. These include the production of nitrous oxides (NOX), sulphur dioxide and 
carbon dioxide, as well the production of particulates. Nitrous oxides and sulphur dioxide 
contribute to acid rain, carbon dioxide to global warming and particulates to dangerous local 
pollution inter alia. 
 
Given the presence of different electricity generation technologies with different 
environmental characteristics it is important to price these external costs in such a way as to 
signal the relative value of clean production to society.  
 
Environmental pollution taxes, permit schemes and legal liability for damage111 can all be 
used to efficiently reflect external costs back on to the producers who create pollution. This 
raises the costs of fossil fuel based production relative to nuclear and renewables cost. 
 
3.4.3.2 General reform experience 
 
There have been very positive experiences with combining reformed wholesale markets with 
appropriate pricing of environmental externalities. This has led to big improvements in the 
quality of the environment and lower imposed system costs. 
Three good examples are the US experience with a national sulphur dioxide permit scheme; 
the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) RECLAIM scheme for the 
pricing of nitrous oxides; and the EU pricing of carbon dioxide. 
The US sulfur permit scheme started in 1994112 by requiring all large coal fired power plants 
in the US to produce permits for each tonne of sulphur dioxide that they produced. This 
scheme successfully reduced SO2 produced from these plants by 60% by 2000 at very low 
cost by incentivising the introduction of new cheaper FGD equipment and by switching to low 
sulphur coal. 
 
The RECLAIM scheme was established in 1994113 and is a permit scheme for pricing nitrous 
oxides in Southern California (covering Los Angeles). This involves pricing nitrous oxides to 
reflect the atmospheric conditions over the area covered. This has been successful in 
managing the amount of local pollution in the area. 
 
The EU introduced a permit scheme for carbon dioxide in 2005. This covers the power sector 
and a number of other energy intensive industrial sectors (and was recently extended to 
aviation). The power sector is around 60% of the current scheme. The scheme has resulted 
in supporting the switching between coal and gas fired electricity generation where this was 
necessary to stay within the permitted quantities of CO2 in the permit market (see Koenig, 
2012). 
 
3.4.3.3 Chinese experience 
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China has a significant problem with air pollution from power plants. In 2014 approximately 
30%, 28% and 5% of SO2, NOX and particulate matter (PM) came from the power sector.114 
Small-scale coal fired power plants have been shut down and replaced with much more 
thermally efficient larger plant115. There has been a move towards installing FGDs on all new 
coal-fired power plants. It has thus far made very limited use of pricing to reduce this air 
pollution to socially optimal levels. 
 
However there have been moves to improve the price based incentives towards cleaner 
production from fossil fuel power plants116. The NDRC does allow higher prices to plants with 
FGDs and 7 carbon market pilots have been introduced which each cover the power sector 
and work in a similar way to the EU ETS117. The pricing of carbon dioxide in the pilot projects 
is between $1-2 per tonne of CO2. This is well short of the $18.60 that might be required to 
facilitate switching from coal to gas fired power generation in 2015 (to switch new 
investment), let alone the price required to switch between a current gas and a current coal 
plan which would be more like $48.61. 
 
There is some limited pricing of sulphur dioxide in some jurisdictions. Within Shanghai 
emissions of SOX and NOX are taxed at 4000 RMB/tonne.118 Regulated generation prices 
include a premium for production of electricity from coal in the presence of an FGD unit.119 
However, this premium is simply provided for the FGD-equipped power plants without 
consideration of their pollutant emission reduction performance. Therefore, some power 
plants installed the low-cost, poor quality FGDs just to earn the benefits from price premium. 
Moreover, one study found that up to 40% of those generation units equipped with FGDs did 
not use them (see Chow and Perkins, 2014). 
 
China has announced that it intends to introduce a national carbon dioxide permit market in 
2017. This is a key part of its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) submitted 
to COP-21120. This will cover the electricity sector and be a significant addition to the global 
effort on greenhouse gas emissions reduction. This can be gradually tightened to begin to 
encourage more efficient coal use and switching from coal to gas in the power sector. 
 
A key recommendation would be the need for China to start using market-based mechanisms 
to price local air pollution, whose costs are both time and location dependent. A national SO2 
market covered both the power sector and other industrial sectors would seem to be a good 
idea, while the idea of local air resources boards (following the experience of RECLAIM) to 
price local contributions to smog and particulates would also be very valuable.121 
 
3.5  All good power market reforms (and indeed, significant economic reforms more 
generally) involve: 
3.5.1  appropriate transition mechanisms (14). 
 
3.5.1.1 Theoretical significance 
 
Economic theory traditionally emphasises end-points and equilibrium outcomes in optimal 
policy design. It suggests that what is, simply, required is to redesign the whole system in a 
particular way and that this will deliver a set of desirable outcomes. The problem in power 
market reform is that the system is large, complex and somewhat unpredictable. Much can go 
wrong in the course of even the best-intentioned and implemented reforms. More importantly 
given that many reform elements cannot be costlessly implemented immediately, there will - 
for many years - be in a situation where not all of the elements for a theoretically robust 
power market reform will have been implemented. The system will be ‘out of equilibrium’ and 
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will need to worry about whether such an ‘out of equilibrium’ situation is better than where it 
started from. Many economists have suggested that the sequencing of reforms is therefore 
very important 122  and that transitional arrangements, particularly to protect the key 
stakeholders that the society is interested in (such as poorer residential customers or small 
businesses). 
 
3.5.1.2 General reform experience 
 
Many electricity reform processes have not gone as society has expected them to. The 
Californian electricity reforms of 1996 proved disastrous, resulting in rolling blackouts by 
2000-01. As we have already observed, this was partially a result of the combination of 
transitional arrangements (fixed retail prices and a restriction on the use of hedging contracts 
by incumbent retailers) and opportunistic behaviour by competing generators in the face of 
high demand. 
 
Even in successful reform countries, such as the UK, there have been problems with market 
power in wholesale generation market in the 1990s (see Newbery, 2005) and a lack of 
competition in the retail market for inert retail customers since 2008 (see CMA, 2016). 
 
Many countries, including the UK have made use of transitional arrangements. These have 
included offering default regulated tariffs even after the market has opened up to competition. 
The retail electricity market in Great Britain was fully liberalised from 1999, but incumbent 
retailers had price controls on their standard tariffs in place until 2002. In Northern lreland, the 
retail margin charged by the incumbent electricity retailer was still subject to regulation in 
2016, in spite of being technically opened up to competition in 1999. This suggests that 
transitional arrangements can last for some time. 
 
3.5.1.3 Chinese context 
 
China is well experienced at transitional arrangements that restrict full competition and protect 
incumbent firms and existing customers123. Such arrangements are particularly important in 
economies where so many prices continue to be regulated and where a ‘big bang’ approach 
where all prices are simultaneously deregulated would produce significant economic 
dislocation.  
 
Full wholesale market competition would significantly favour low cost producers of fossil fuels. 
While this is desirable in the long run it would result in immediate significant losses of output 
and revenue for certain generation plants and consequent reductions in coal demand from 
certain mines. Here transitional arrangements might include capacity payments for power 
plants to keep them open and maintain profitability124. 
 
Significant retail competition would also result in losses for the incumbent grid companies. 
This would be premised on them having set the levels of their network charges correctly to 
continue to allow their operations to be financed. 
 
China is still some way from moving to full wholesale and retail competition. Even where 
market segments (e.g. large industrial users of electricity) are opened up to competition there 
is a case for some transitional arrangements (such as maximum prices) or restrictions on the 
ability of generators/retailers to cross-subsidise competition by increasing prices elsewhere. 
Transitional arrangements can be introduced selectively and where necessary. Good 
monitoring of the effects of the introduction of prices on the bills consumers pay and the 
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profitability of state owned companies is necessary in order to assess whether transitional 
arrangements are adequate or necessary. 
 
A key task of the reform process would seem to be reducing the volume of new investment 
going into the power sector. As we have already noted this was $120bn in 2015, at a time 
when demand growth was beginning to moderate. Reducing this level of investment will 
require the phased redeployment of the huge resources being put into to both new power 
station building and network asset expansion. Even if this amount could be reduced by only 
$10bn per year, this would potentially save around 2.5% of the industrial price of electricity125. 
 
China has instituted a significant number of pilot projects (see Table 10 below), but many of 
these do not test many of design principles of liberalised markets we have outlined in this 
paper. For example, experiments to test spot market for power in real time, competitive 
procurement for renewables and locational pricing signals for renewables are missing from 
the set of pilot projects. Indeed, it is not altogether clear what is really being tested in the pilot 
projects beyond the systems and ways of working in price based arrangements, since the 
principles of liberalisation are well established from global experience. 
 
From Table 10, we are also interested in the role of local governments’ energy agencies for 
advancing these pilot projects. The literature points out that local energy agencies in China do 
not have a wide range of decision-making power and policy space to launch their own pilot 
projects. Most of the current pilot projects are designed by the NDRC (though with 
participation from the provincial and local energy agencies). The central and local NDRCs 
supervise the provincial energy agencies to implement these local pilots. More freedom to 
initiate local pilot projects, for instance within the China Southern Grid provinces, with support 
from local governments and industry stakeholders would seem desirable.    
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Table 10: Electricity market pilot projects 
Selected Local Pilots in China Progress Summary 
Shenzhen City National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) launched Shenzhen City’s Transmission-
Distribution Price reform pilot in November 2014. 
NDRC had a detail check on the transmission-
distribution price, and after implementing this 
reform pilot, the level of transmission-distribution 
price even decreased, which also lowered the 
terminal power-sale price. During this reform 
period, a number of power-selling companies were 
set up and the commercial electricity price became 
lower in Shenzhen City.  The industrial and 
commercial utilities both share the benefits of a 
lower power price. 
Inner Mongolia In June 2015, the Transmission –Distribution price 
reform pilot was approved in Inner Mongolia by 
NDRC. NDRC also reviewed the revenue of power 
transmission and distribution operations as well as 
the price in Inner Mongolia in September 2015. 
This review clarifies the transmission-distribution 
prices of different voltage levels and for different 
customers. Basically, this reform indicates that 
customers should pay different prices based on 
the voltage levels and the price should also 
include cross-subsidization. As a result, in this 
reform scheme the reduced price has mainly 
brought benefits to the large-scale industrial users.      
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region NDRC completed its review on Ningxia’s Scheme 
of Transmission-Distribution Price Reform Pilot in 
September 2015. Ningxia project is also the first 
pilot reform approved by the State Grid. Compared 
to other electricity reform schemes in Inner 
Mongolia and Shenzhen City, the Ningxia Scheme 
made a clear progress in setting up mechanisms 
for transmission-distribution price reform. 
Yunnan Province Yunnan Province is a pioneer in China’s market-
oriented electricity trading. In 2015, the Industry & 
Information Technology Commission in Yunnan 
and Yunnan provincial government established a 
“3134” trading mode, which covers “three main 
parts, one center, three markets, and four modes.” 
Based on these market-oriented trading and 
transmission-distribution reform progresses, 
NDRC reviewed the Scheme of Transmission-
Distribution Price Reform Pilot of Power Grid in 
Yunnan Province in October 2015, and Yunnan 
thus was approved as a comprehensive power 
trading pilot in November 2015. 
Guizhou Province In July 2015, the pilot scheme – Deepening Power 
Sector Reform - in Guizhou province was 
approved by Guizhou Government. It adopts a 
similar model with Shenzhen City for reforming the 
transmission-distribution price. There are four 
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Source: China5e Research Centre (2016, pp.34-61) 
 
Xu (2017, p.170) emphasises the point that previous trials with market competition prior to 
March 2015 were not successful because of a lack of generation capacity in the trial, below 
cost retail prices, insufficient interconnection and a lack of experienced regulatory oversight. 
This highlights the importance of timing and adequate preparation for a sustained and 
successful reform process. 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
International Lessons and Policy Priorities for China 
 
Successful reform in China is not about the success of its electricity companies as companies 
(consider the US and Germany), except in the sense that really efficient electricity companies 
support the rest of the economy by releasing labour to be more productive elsewhere and 
keeping the cost of power down. The entire utility privatisation programme in the UK between 
1979 and 1997 released 2% of the entire workforce back to the rest of the economy and 
boosting economy wide productivity.  
 
drivers for this reform pilot in Guizhou: (i) thermal 
power companies face difficulties because of the 
reduced utilization hours of power generation; (ii) 
Guizhou provinces has abundant coal resources; 
(iii) High electricity consumption local industries 
need lower price electricity supply, and (iv) 
Guizhou province had strong foundation for direct 
electricity trading.   
Shanxi Province The Shanxi’ pilot was approved by Reform 
Commission NDRC and NEA in February 2016. It 
is the first reform pilot integrated within the 
network of State Grid. Three features of this pilot 
are: (i) The Shanxi Grid independently runs a 
trading centre and connects with other 
shareholders together; (ii) This pilot reform sets up 
a clear increments distribution standard and (iii) It 
has established a spot trading mechanism.      
Chongqing The pilot in Chongqing was approved by the 
General Office of NDRC and NEA’s General 
Affairs Department in November 2015. In 
December 2015, three pilot selling companies 
were set up, which marked the beginning of 
Chongqing’s pilot. In February 2016, twelve 
companies entered an agreement with one selling 
electricity corporation, which shows that the 
authority has put the pilot in practice and currently 
keeps refining it.   
Guangdong Province Similar to Chongqing, the selling side reform in 
Guangdong is however in a slower progress. In 
2016, the authority established the basic rules of 
trading mechanism and enhanced the technical 
supporting system by simulation operations. The 
electricity trading will officially start in 2017.   
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A key driver of the current reform is the high price of electricity for industrial customers 
relative to the US. We have identified four major savings within the power sector that would 
bring down prices for industrial customers. These are reform of dispatch (which might 
reduce coal use by up to 6% and allow industrial prices to fall by 1-2%); increasing the 
efficiency of the grid companies (which might reduce industrial prices by 2-3%); and 
rebalancing charges away from industrial to residential customers to better reflect 
underlying system costs (which might reduce industrial prices by up to 5%) and reducing the 
high rate of investment in generation/networks by $10bn per year could also reduce 
prices for industrial customers by of the order of 3%. None of the savings are easy to deliver 
because they have significant re-distributional implications. However, they have been 
achieved in many other countries, albeit over a period of up to 10 years. They suggest that 
the non-fuel cost gap - amounting to 12% of the current Chinese industrial electricity price - 
that we identified between China and the US can be eliminated. 
 
If the gap with the US is to be further reduced, this would take a comprehensive reform of the 
coal sector (and of value added taxation in the electricity sector). Rationalisation of the coal 
sector might reduce costs to those in the US, and this would substantially close the remaining 
price gap. A combination of tax changes or cheaper sources of energy (e.g. shale gas) could 
further reduce the price differential. 
 
China needs to view electricity market reform in the context of what it can do for the rest of 
the Chinese economy and resist vested interests within the sector that would seek to limit its 
rationalisation. A key part of this is the opportunity to simultaneously rationalise the coal 
production sector (which has 4.3m employees, slightly more than the whole electricity sector), 
by reducing coal demand and improving coal sector productivity. The decoupling of electricity 
policy from national procurement strategies for fossil fuel and nuclear technologies was a key 
driver of cost reduction towards new investment in Europe and the US. An additional impetus 
to reduce Chinese dependence on coal for power production might be the rapid recent 
decline in the reserves to production ratio for Chinese coal. 
 
Comprehensive power market reform based on the creation of competitive wholesale and 
retail markets and separately regulated network businesses is once again being pushed 
forward in China (following the publication in March 2015 of the No.9 Document), building on 
the 2002 reform (which separated the grid from generation) but subsequently stalled. The 
primary objective is to lower prices for industrial customers, with the additional objectives of 
reducing wind curtailment and reducing overinvestment in new dirty coal fired power plants. 
The likely extent of power market reform remains linked to reduction in coal use. Unless there 
is a willingness to rationalise and reduce coal use in China at the individual plant/mine level 
then power market reform will make limited progress on the ground. 
 
China has devolved a lot of energy investment decisions to the provinces. This has favoured 
provincial coal mines and encouraged the pursuit of energy independence among the 
provinces. This is because coal production and coal generation contribute to provincial GDP 
targets, and local coal mines and coal generation contributes to provincial tax revenue. This 
undermines a regional/national market emerging to the extent that is fully beneficial to the 
national economy. Clearly the central government has to strongly regulate interprovincial 
electricity trade and encourage its development. 
 
While much of the reform process emphasises a move to market trading of electricity, power 
plants are still not being dispatched in merit order in real time. The government needs to 
prioritise reform of dispatch (with its implications for coal use and the value of existing 
generation assets) if a genuine wholesale market is to emerge which drives operational costs 
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down and incentivises significant efficiency gains from making better use of the existing 
power generation fleet. 
 
The government’s current capacity to regulate a competitive power sector is limited. There is 
a shortage of well-qualified/well-trained staff (accountants, economists and lawyers), who can 
administer and regulate the institutions of the market, partly due to low public sector salaries 
(relative to SOE salaries). There continues to be a need to reduce the power of the State Grid 
Corporation in setting/frustrating policy in favour of well-resourced and independent (of the 
industry) civil servants. This could be achieved by transferring some of the research functions 
of State Grid to the central government, and treating State Grid as an interested party with its 
own internal financial incentives (like generators) in policy discussions. 
 
More encouragingly, the latest round of reforms (embodied in the Number 9 document) have 
laudable intentions but also are proceeding rather carefully given the complicated and 
interconnected nature of unwinding the current regulatory arrangements surrounding the 
power sector. A number of pilot projects introducing wholesale forward markets for industrial 
power are underway and the government is, rightly, proceeding cautiously towards 
comprehensive market reform. There has been real progress in separating out 
generation/retail from the network businesses and provincial prices for network access 
(based on assessments of the regulatory asset and operating cost base) are now published. 
900 companies retail have been registered by the end 2016, but none were actually 
operational marketing electricity. The preconditions for incentive regulation of the network 
business of State Grid and Southern China Grid are now in place. 
 
Now is a good moment to push forward with reform. Final prices are high (for industry and 
this is a major driver of reform because of low US industrial energy prices). The electricity 
industry is profitable relative to underlying costs (which have fallen in line with commodity 
price falls). The pilot wholesale markets are showing price reductions for industrial customers. 
There is also environmental pressure to end wind curtailment (which is very high) and mostly 
due to the hours based contracts held by coal fired power plants. The moment may of course 
pass if commodity prices start rising. 
 
Suggestions for future research 
 
We have identified five sources of lower power prices for industrial users. These are all 
worthy of several multifaceted studies. 
 
1. The size of the dispatch savings. This requires careful modelling of constraints and 
of the distributional implications for individual companies and consideration of what 
compensation is necessary; 
2. Modelling of the impacts of reallocating charges from industrial to residential 
customers over a 10-year period, during which incomes and household consumption 
continue to grow strongly; 
3. Efficiency modelling of the scope for cost reduction in the grid companies and 
exposure to incentive regulation. There is a surprising lack of papers on the efficiency 
of the different business units of the grid companies; 
4. Modelling of the financial impact on electricity customers of over-investment in 
generation and consideration of how new investment in fossil fuel generation (to the 
extent that it is required) can be reduced; 
5. Further work on the scope for rationalising the fuel input sector in China and 
how China can get access to cheaper coal and gas. This might draw parallels from 
historical heavy industry rationalisation processes in Europe, Korea and Japan. 
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In addition, we would note the following: 
 
There needs to be investigation of the design and lessons from the market pilot 
projects. The current pilot projects need to demonstrate that they are supporting the 
underlying rationalisation of the sector that is required to bring its costs down and improve its 
environmental performance. There might be a need for additional pilots to trial different 
aspects of reform (such as price bid led dispatch).  
 
The calculation of network tariffs needs to be carefully analysed. This benefits from 
independent study because the regulator is initially in a weak information position relative to 
the regulated companies. The scope for network tariffs to be calculated wrongly / incentives 
to be miss-calibrated is quite high. 
 
China has taken a number of significant reform steps since 1985. It is, perhaps, surprising 
that there has not been more careful analysis of the impact of the different reform 
steps. For instance: how have publicly owned generators performed against privately owned 
ones, or whether different state investment vehicles have a better record of managing their 
assets efficiently. In particular, it would also be good to look at the impact of the 2002 
reorganisation of generation and distribution on efficiency. 
 
China needs to benchmark its performance with those of other countries. This is 
particularly valuable in the initial stages of reform, when it is difficult to get meaningful internal 
benchmarks. It would be good to see more comparative analysis of the costs of generation 
and networks between other countries and China. 
 
China’s power market reform still needs to address its air pollution problem. While 
rationalisation of the power sector will reduce pollution, a low carbon transition is still required 
and this will necessitate close attention to how renewable and nuclear procurement can be 
made more competitive. 
 
There should be more attention to comparative research between sectors within China, 
it would be good to consider whether successful liberalisation and economic regulation of 
other sectors might inform electricity reform in China. Regulation and liberalisation are 
transferable skills between sectors and there may be things to learn from, for instance, the IT 
sector in China. 
 
There needs to be a new institutional economic analysis of how to design a successful 
regulator in China (drawing on lessons from other countries and sectors) by considering the 
incentives within the civil service to effectively regulate large monopoly companies, in a way 
that ensures a reasonable degree of independence from arbitrary central and provincial 
government interference. 
 
The question of how best to make use of the ability for different regions to move at 
different speeds should be carefully considered (e.g. reforming residential pricing in richer 
provinces first). Research that is specific to the reform circumstances of particular provinces 
would be valuable. 
 
Finally, given the large degree of misunderstanding (globally) of the macro-benefits of lower 
power prices and the release of labour from the power and coal system, it would be good to 
see some general equilibrium modelling of the benefits to the Chinese economy of 
power market reform. 
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Appendix A: Calculation process of the switching carbon prices from coal to gas fired 
power plant investment in 2015 
 
NO. Steps Coal  Gas Source 
1 LCOE (discount rate 7%)(USD/MWh) 77.72 92.79 IEA (2015, P.98) 
1 LCOE (discount rate 7%)(USD/KWh) 0.07772 0.09279   
1 LCOE difference (USD/KWh)  (Coal -gas) -0.01507(0.07772-0.09279)   
2 fuel consumption  442.216(g/KWh) 0.19125 (Nm3/KWh) Zhang et al.(2012, P.232) 
2 Emission coefficient(Coal) 2.78124 kg CO2/ kg Coal Zhang et al.(2012, P.233) 
2 Emission coefficient(Gas) 2.19362 kg CO2/ Nm3 Zhang et al.(2012, P.233) 
2 CO2 emission(kg CO2/KWh) 1.230  (442.216*2.78124/1000) 
0.420 
(0.19125*2.19362)   
2 CO2 emission(ton CO2/KWh) 0.00123 0.000420   
2 CO2 emission difference (kgCO2/KWh)(Coal -gas) 0.000810(0.001230-0.000420)   
3 Switch Price from coal to gas  (USD/ ton) 18.60 (0.01507/0.000810)   
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Appendix B: Calculation process of the switching carbon prices from coal to gas fired 
power generation in 2015 
  
Industrial Electricity  
Price (US $/KWh) 
In 2014 
Coal price  
(US $/KWh) 
in 2014 
Gas price  
(US $/KWh)  
in 2014 
Switching price 
$ / tonne CO2 
US  0.0710  0.0241  0.0159  6.98 
China 0.1068  0.0384  0.0778  48.61 
 
 
  China 
  Coal  Gas 
Heat rate 
(g/KWh) (Nm3/KWh) 
442.216 0.19125 
Price  
yuan/ton yuan/m3 
534 2.5 
carbon emissions 
kg CO2/ kg Coal kg CO2/ Nm3 
2.78124 2.19362 
Power generation cost 
difference 
（yuan/KWh） -0.241981656 
carbon emissions difference  
(ton/KWh) 0.000810379 
Switching CO2 price 
($/ton) 48.61 
 
US 
  Coal  Gas 
Heat rate 
(g/KWh) (Nm3/KWh) 
442.216 0.19125 
Price  
$/ton $/m3 
54.5 0.1555995 
carbon emissions 
kg CO2/ kg Coal kg CO2/ Nm3 
2.78124 2.19362 
Power generation cost 
difference 
（$/KWh） -0.005657632 
carbon emissions difference  
(ton/KWh) 0.000810379 
Switching CO2 price 
($/ton) 6.98 
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